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AN EXPOSURE, OR, EXAMINATION, OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH MINISTERS,

From the Commencement of the War againſt the Americans, till the preſent Time;

Contraſted with the Operations that were moſt ſuitable to the Intereſts of Great-Britain.

By Mr. JOLY de St. VALIER,

Lieutenant-Colonel of Infantry;

Conformably to what he ſaid in his Memorial, " That for " above theſe four Years he has ſufficiently *ſtudied the Mi-* " *niſters*, and *their Operations*, to be able to bring them to " Light, and make known *the full Value of them*.

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Rec^d May 1. 1845
Bot with the Bequest of
Hon Wm Prescott
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PREFACE.

I DID not conceal from myſelf the difficulties of this work when I undertook it; much leſs the reproach I might be ſubject to, for having undertaken it, and eſpecially for publiſhing it. "How comes he to "interfere?" people will ſay: "He is no "Engliſhman; he is nothing to the Engliſh "nation. Why does he take it into his head "to bring together, and lay open, the ope-"rations of our Miniſtry? Whether good "or bad, what right has he to take cogni-"zance?" I am fully ſenſible of the weakneſs, the abſurdity of this reproach; but I likewiſe perceive, that endeavours will be made to give it all poſſible force and importance, in order to impeach me, or at leaſt to treat me with an air of ridicule. It therefore behoves me to give it an anſwer.

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I am not an Engliſhman: that is true. I am nothing to the Engliſh nation: that is not ſtrictly true. If I am nothing to it, yet ought I to be ſomething to it: I came to make a tender of my ſervices to it; for doing which I did not take the inſtant of its proſperity, I choſe that wherein it was at the eve of a moſt alarming criſis. I brought a plan of operations which might at the time have proved of the utmoſt advantage to Britain, *and were abſolutely unknown to its Miniſters*; operations uſeful to it to this very day, and to which alone it will be indebted for *a revolution of events in favour of England; which revolution is perhaps not very diſtant, and would certainly be brought about, if affairs were managed by a ſet of men of tolerable underſtanding*. Hitherto no one has contradicted the political Memorials that I have publiſhed, and which I reluctantly committed to the preſs, becauſe they ſhould have been kept in the utmoſt ſecrecy. *It does not ſeem to me poſſible to oppoſe any thing, even of the ſmalleſt weight, to the operations I have pointed out in my Memorial.* After which, if I am nothing to the Engliſh nation, I think I ought however to

be

be ſomething to it. Beſides, as I am come to offer my ſervice to the King, and the Engliſh nation; if what I am about to ſet forth can be of advantage (and I certainly would not have written it, *had I not deemed it of the greateſt utility)* I act ſuitably to my firſt plan: there is no inconſiſtency in my conduct; it is natural I ſhould make known the uſefulneſs I may be of, and it becomes ridiculous to aſk me what buſineſs I have to interfere.

A ſecond motive which determined me to this work, is, my having declared in my letters to the Miniſters, that I was poſſeſſed of important matters, which I was deſirous of imparting to them. As they well knew *I neither acted in the capacity of a Traitor, nor a Spy of any kind whatever*, they conſequently knew that I could only mean to ſpeak of ſome operations which I thought important. I know not whether the Memorials which I had tranſmitted to them, and which are now known to the Public, deſerved the *diſdainful* ſilence they have affected to me. The Public may at preſent judge of them: but by laying

laying open their operations, *I ſhall perhaps give a hint of thoſe I deſired to point out to them*; I ſhall perhaps make it appear, whether they deſerved all the *contempt* the Miniſters have expreſſed for me.

A third reaſon that determined me to this work is, that, as I declared at the concluſion of my Memorial, that during above four years *I have ſufficiently ſtudied their operations to be able to bring them to light, and make known the full value of them*; I might be ſuſpected of having announced more than I could perform. The ſilence of the Miniſtry, in that reſpect, is no ways ſurpriſing, *if they will allow me any ſhare of underſtanding*; but my ſilence, after proceeding ſo far, *would appear very extraordinary*. Such are the motives which have determined me to this publication, the conſequences of which I am ſenſible of.

I am aware of all the advantages the Miniſters have over me, *who ſtand ſingle, without any acquaintance, without any ſupport*; I know their power, I know all the means they *can employ to ſeduce, to, &c. . . . . I know they excel*

excel in nothing but the arts of ſeduction, of .... but all thoſe advantages Miniſters poſſeſs above me, have not been able *to overawe me*.

This Expoſure contains ſubjects too intereſting not to require *the greateſt attention* from the Reader, whom I muſt therefore intreat not to content himſelf with a ſingle peruſal of it, as I believe it needs rather to be read twice than once, to be rightly underſtood. It is plain I ſeek to impoſe upon nobody.

EXAMINATION

OF THE

OPERATIONS

That have taken place in ENGLAND, from the Beginning of the AMERICAN WAR till now.

IT is not the buſineſs of the preſent moment, to examine whether what gave riſe to the war againſt the Americans was grounded on juſtice and neceſſity, or on oppreſſion and violence; a queſtion long ſince diſcuſſed: and it ſeems to be pretty generally attributed, in its origin, to the injuſtice and violence of the Miniſtry. Let us proceed to their operations ſince the war began.

When the troubles of America had been carried to certain lengths, Miniſters acquainted the Parliament, with equal ſelf-ſufficiency and pride, that with reſolution, and very moderate exertions, the Americans

would ſoon be brought back to the obedience required of them; in conſequence of which the Parliament granted them their demands, and they were permitted to act. Having failed in their firſt operations, what did the Miniſters alledge to juſtify themſelves? They ſaid, that they had been ill informed. This excuſe is allowed of; their demands are a ſecond time complied with, and they are ſuffered to act a-new. They miſcarry again. What is their exculpatory anſwer? Why, that they had been miſinformed. Patience is not yet worn out: they make extravagant demands, with which a man of tolerable abilities, in leſs than two campaigns, would have brought the affairs of America to a ſucceſsful iſſue.—Thoſe demands are granted! What is the reſult? A temporary advantage,—ſoon followed by the entire loſs of an Engliſh army, and by misfortunes the moſt conſtant, the moſt humiliating, and repeated without the hopes of any ſucceſs of moment! What do the Miniſters then ſay for themſelves? Not that they had been miſinformed, though that excuſe would have been very applicable; but they

they impeach, they disgrace Generals, who have done all it was possible for men to do, and who only miscarried because the operations with which they were charged were impracticable; because a Deity in human form would miscarry in the execution, though he were possessed of all the extent of knowledge the human understanding is susceptible of. Ministers, then, have not been better informed; Ministers, then, are not better informed, after four, after six years experience, than they were at the beginning. After that, I believe we may with certainty pass judgement, that they will not be better informed in future.

Now I ask with what eye men would have looked, and would look in any country of the world whatever, under any government, either despotic or republican, on Ministers, who, in order to engage their nation in an affair, which, if it chanced to miscarry, must necessarily occasion the ruin and destruction of that nation, represent it as an affair easy in its execution; and who, after they have miscarried in every thing, have no other excuse

to alledge, than that they have been misinformed? Were this excuse to be allowed of any weight, what man would not thereby justify the most foolish conduct? What can be expected from such Ministers?

To me it seems, that after that, the Parliament would have been authorized, from the very beginning, to refuse them the least confidence; to me it seems the Parliament would have had good reason to reject with scorn all demands made by them afterwards, and to protest against all their operations. Yet this it did not do; it even granted them beyond their demands, in order to continue their labours, lest it should cast a damp on affairs. Now, because there are a few enlightened Members of Parliament, who with great moderation contradict Ministers who so unsuccessfully manage the affairs of their country—Ministers, who, to apologize for their ill success, have no other excuse to bring, but that they were ill informed; those Ministers style them factious, accuse them of fanning the fire of sedition and rebellion in the minds of the people; they accuse them of encouraging

couraging the enemy, and diſcouraging the nation. Before we go farther, let us dwell a little on the complaints of Miniſters againſt the debates of the Oppoſition: it is too important an object not to require a more extenſive ſurvey. Amongſt ſeveral ſubjects which have cauſed ſtrong debates in Parliament, I ſhall content myſelf with ſpeaking of this one.

When the Parliament, in the enſuing year, called for a liſt of the forces employed by the Miniſters during the foregoing campaign, in order to judge whether they had raiſed thoſe that had been voted, and employed to that purpoſe all the ſubſidies that had been granted them; the Miniſtry always ſkulked behind the ſhadow of myſterioufneſs: they ſaid, it would be letting the enemy know what forces we had on foot, and the diſtribution of them; they ſaid, the enemy might take advantage of the knowledge of what was proper to be kept ſecret on ſuch matters; and the late Parliament, to my great ſurpriſe, always remained ſatisfied with this anſwer. Let us examine the value of this anſwer, in order to judge whether

ther it deſerves all the condeſcenſion it has hitherto met with.

If the Parliament were to ſay to the Miniſters, Here are ſuch a number of forces demanded by you, and granted by us; tell us now how you are going to diſpoſe of them, what are the operations you have planned? I apprehend, that the Miniſters might with ſome reaſon ſay, that the inveſtigations they wiſhed to enter into, might afford light to the enemy, and that he might draw advantage from ſuch knowledge. But when, ſeveral months after the concluſion of a campaign, when already a plan of operations for the enſuing one is drawn up, the Miniſters are aſked a liſt of the forces they had on foot the laſt campaign; I ſhould wiſh to know what danger there can be in ſetting forth, with openneſs and perſpicuity, the exiſtence of forces voted for the operations of that campaign, and for which the ſubſidies neceſſary both for raiſing and maintaining them have been exactly received; I could wiſh to know what danger there can be in aſcertaining that exiſtence by circumſtantial certificates from

from the Generals and Admirals that have commanded them.

All Europe is informed what forces, either by land or by ſea, England is to have on foot during a campaign, ſince they have been voted openly in Parliament; ſince the ſubſidies have been granted in purſuance; ſince thoſe ſubſidies having been duly paid, there has been no reaſon why thoſe forces ſhould not have exiſted, or, if any reaſons have been for their non-exiſtence, the Miniſters are to inform the nation, and account with it for the ſums unemployed. The only point therefore is, to know whether thoſe forces have exiſted; to know whether the Miniſters have fulfilled the intentions of the nation, whether they have applied the ſubſidies to the uſe pointed out. Methinks this is a very juſt, well-grounded, natural object of enquiry. Is it not evident, that a contrary conduct muſt be productive of the moſt pernicious conſequences to the ſtate?

The method of aſcertaining that exiſtence cannot expoſe the nation to any danger: it

is enough if the Generals and Admirals certify, that they have had ſuch forces under their command; and, by the aggregate of thoſe certificates, it may eaſily be judged whether the whole of the forces that were voted has exiſted, and at what time it exiſted. To avoid the very ſhadow of danger, it is not required of the Generals and Admirals to enumerate the different poſts in which thoſe forces are diſperſed, though that were a matter of no conſequence when a campaign is ended, and the enemy has had all poſſible leiſure to take cognizance of their quality and number. All that is aſked of them is, to certify the number of forces tranſmitted to them, and the period at which they received them. I aſk, What danger can there be in all this? For my part, I cannot poſſibly perceive any, in whatever light the matter is ſet; and I perceive the greateſt neceſſity for the nation to have its eyes opened on ſo important an object. I am thoroughly ſenſible, that Miniſters may have perſonal motives, very cogent with them, to make a myſtery of it; but I ſay once more, it is impoſſible for me to diſcover the neceſſity of

that

that myſtery with regard to the public weal; on the contrary, I ſee nothing in it but the moſt imminent danger.

Would one not think, by the myſterious air Miniſters affect on this ſubject, that they have forces hid in the clouds, or in ambuſh in ſome thick foreſt, ready to fall on the enemy, when he leaſt expects it, and of which he muſt be kept from the knowledge? Would one not think they had ſent troops into places impenetrable to the enemy? If ſo, what avail thoſe forces? But if they have been ſent either to make an attack, or to defend themſelves, can they imagine the enemy has not had knowledge both of their quality and number? To what purpoſe then the myſtery they mean to make of them? Yet the Parliament never inſiſted upon ſo important an object. After ſuch condeſcenſion, how can Miniſters complain of the debates of the Oppoſition, ſince they have proved ineffectual? Is there not room to be perſuaded, that to ſuch condeſcenſion are chiefly to be attributed the misfortunes the nation has ex-

perienced? Let us, for ſome moments longer, purſue our obſervations on this ſubject.

Miniſters ceaſe not to accuſe Oppoſition of thwarting their operations, and thereby being the cauſe of their ill ſucceſs. For theſe reproaches to be well grounded, Miniſters muſt be able to prove, firſt, that Oppoſition refuſed them the ſubſidies they demanded, which incapacitated them for acting as they deſired. But, far from being denied by the Oppoſition, or by Parliament, the ſubſidies they demanded, the Parliament has annually granted them one million extraordinary, beyond the ſums propoſed for the ſervice of Government. This, methinks, is doing things ſo as to leave no room for complaint. Miniſters ſhould be able to prove, ſecondly, that the Oppoſition has informed the enemy of their projects, and that has made them miſcarry. Were that the caſe, Miniſters would not have failed to impeach thoſe who were guilty of ſuch a piece of treachery, and to have them puniſhed. They would eagerly have ſeized that opportunity of exculpating themſelves for their ill ſucceſs; *they who*

make

make ſuch a ſtir, when they can intercept a few letters that ſignify nothing. Their not doing it, is an evident proof that no ſuch thing ever exiſted. What then can the Miniſtry juſtly upbraid the Oppoſition with?

Has there not ever been an Oppoſition in the Parliament? Have not the debates of the Oppoſition often afforded light to the Miniſters, and pointed out to them ſuch operations as were conducive to the welfare of the ſtate? Have not the debates of the Oppoſition often proved a light to the Monarch, and determined him to chooſe more able Miniſters in arduous times? Are recent proofs of this required? Caſt an eye on the tranſactions at the beginning of the war in 1740, and of that in 1756. To the ſteady debates of the Oppoſition was the King indebted for the choice of thoſe able Miniſters who managed the affairs of their country with ſo much glory and ſucceſs. By means of thoſe ſteady debates he became acquainted with the neceſſity of removing men incapable of ſitting at the helm in times of difficulty. Can it be doubted, after this, but *that the Oppoſition*

*is the ſafeſt, the moſt unſhaken bulwark of the ſtate?** To this let us add an obſervation of high concern. Far from its being the debates of Oppoſition that encourage the Americans in the courſe they have taken; *to that Oppoſition will England owe the return of the Americans,* if ever their reconciliation to the Mother Country *can be effected.* This is what the Miniſters do not perceive, *or pretend not to perceive;* ſuch is either their blindneſs, or their injuſtice. What do the Miniſters therefore mean by ſo violent an outcry againſt the Oppoſition? Doubtleſs, they require a blind compliance, from the whole nation, with their meaſures, whatever

* People might perhaps ſuſpect my having been ſolicited by ſome Member of the Oppoſition to pen this Memorial. I declare, on my word of honour, that I am acquainted with no one in England; and that, for theſe five months I have reſided here, my intercourſe has been confined to Mr. de Rumilli and Mr. Cordicelli, who both ſometimes favour me with their company for a few moments; and ſurely they will not be ſuſpected of meddling with ſtate affairs. If I ſwerve from the truth, I deſire to be looked upon and treated as an impoſtor. What I write, I write on my own accord; I write it without the help of any one, and after thorough reflection.

ever they may be: but then they are *deſpots*, abſolutely *deſpots*.

The Oppoſition, ſay they, encourages the Enemy, and diſcourages the Nation. Do they believe it? I am perſuaded they do not. There has ever been an Oppoſition; and affairs have not fared the worſe, when properly conducted. Nay, more; *in a conſtitution like that of Britain, it is eſſential there always ſhould exiſt an Oppoſition.* That Oppoſition, were it even always wrong in its debates, *maintains the Nation in an habitual watchfulneſs over the Executive Power. The greateſt misfortune that could befall the Engliſh Nation, would be for it to grow remiſs in that reſpect.* From that moment it would ſoon loſe its liberty: but the Oppoſition has not now to reproach itſelf with being wrong in its debates; they are but too well grounded.

What encourages the Enemy, what diſcourages the Nation, are ill-managed and unſucceſsful operations. When matters are conducted with ſkill, with underſtanding, the

the Oppoſition is firſt to applaud them, or its clamours are weak and ineffectual.

Let Miniſters, then, ſay what the debates in Parliament can effect againſt their operations? Are they not at full liberty to combine and direct them as they judge proper? Do the debates in Parliament prevent their forming ſuch or ſuch a project, or hinder them from putting it into execution? Do the debates in Parliament divulge their operations? No certainly. Miniſters are free to plan and execute them with the greateſt ſecrecy; they account for them to nobody, nor does the Parliament know of them till they have been executed! 'Tis then, methinks, it may be allowed, nay, *it is its duty*, to appreciate their value, in order to judge of the ability of thoſe who formed them; to judge whether it be fit to leave the helm of Government in their hands. Would not blind condeſcenſion in ſuch a caſe be criminal? Would it not bring on the ruin of the State, if thoſe who are at the head of affairs are incapable of conducting them?

Yet

Yet it is this blind condeſcenſion which Miniſters would at this day require; they preach up thorough paſſive obedience; they enjoin ſilence concerning their operations; they will have us ſuffer them to act, without ſhewing the leaſt degree of uneaſineſs concerning what they are about. Never did abettor of paſſive obedience more ſeaſonably preach up that doctrine, I confeſs. But if it falls in with the intereſt of the Miniſters, does it equally ſuit with that of the Nation?

Purſuant to this doctrine, for which the Miniſters are this day ſticklers; if any one ſhews them the leaſt reſiſtance, they treat him, and cauſe him to be treated by their dependants, as factious, as a man who breathes the ſpirit of riot and rebellion into the heart of the Nation; and willingly would they puniſh and cauſe him to be puniſhed as ſuch.

Thus do Miniſters expreſs themſelves in the moſt deſpotic realms of the Eaſt, and of Europe, to juſtify their violent proceedings againſt thoſe who dare to contradict their conduct. But truth at length breaks thro',

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and it very often happens that thoſe Miniſters fall victims to their folly and violence; they fall into diſgrace, become objects of the public contempt and hatred: it ſometimes falls out that it coſts them their lives, whilſt thoſe whom they have oppreſſed are afterwards loaded with favours and honours. We daily ſee moſt ſtriking examples of the like events.

Thoſe Miniſters, however, have a pretence which ſeems in ſome ſort to juſtify their conduct on thoſe occaſions. It is known to every body, that in deſpotic ſtates the Monarchs are accounted to govern in their own perſons, and their Miniſters to be charged only with the execution of their commands; ſo that whoever attacks the operations of the Government, ſeems to arraign the very conduct of the Sovereign. But here the caſe is different; all know that Miniſters have the ſole direction, and that the Sovereign has no ſhare in it; ſo that calling the Miniſters to account, *is no breach of duty to the Monarch.* Every one knows, that in deſpotic countries the nation has entirely yielded up to the Sovereign the reins of Government;

whilſt

whilſt here the nation has reſerved to itſelf the power of inveſtigating the conduct of thoſe to whom it has entruſted the executive power; ſo that a blind acquieſcence on the part of its Repreſentatives to the will and meaſures of the Miniſtry would be highly criminal. This, I think, is ſufficient to prove how ſhocking, how iniquitous it is to ſtigmatize as factious thoſe Members of Parliament who have the courage and reſolution to ſtand up againſt the proceedings of Miniſters, and to call them to account. The diſtreſſes the nation at this day labours under, the accumulated miſcarriages, the ſmall hopes of ſeeing more ſucceſsful events in future, make it their indiſpenſible duty ſo to act. Let us proceed in our obſervations upon the operations of the Miniſters.

Miniſters have repeatedly ſaid in open Parliament, that they ſhould not deſerve to be Miniſters if they had not always in hand forces able to cope with, and ſucceſsfully engage, not only the united powers of France and Spain, but even of all Europe, were it to form a confederacy againſt Britain. This

has been their frequent boaſt in full Parliament. Let us now ſee what has been the reſult of all this pompous high-ſounding diſplay of words.

France enters into a treaty with the Americans; France fits out at Toulon an armament in favour of the Americans; France therefore, by this behaviour, provokes againſt its ſingle ſelf thoſe immenſe forces that were to make head againſt all Europe, if it had taken up arms againſt England. Who would not have thought, after what the Miniſters had boaſted, that England was going to ſwallow up in an inſtant the forces of France? Let us in the firſt place examine what were the forces that the Miniſters had on foot when this event took place; we will next conſider the motives they might have for leaving England in the enfeebled ſtate it was then in; after which we will compare the operations that would have ſuited the intereſt of Britain, with thoſe that were actually put in execution by the Miniſtry.

What

What were the forces the Miniſters had to oppoſe to thoſe of France at the period of its treaty with the Americans? None, or ſcarcely any. To be convinced of the truth of this aſſertion, we muſt deſcend to particulars.

Miniſtry had no fleet in the Mediterranean, where they ſhould have had one; whither they ſhould at leaſt have ſent a conſiderable one at the inſtant France concluded a treaty with the Americans, as we ſhall preſently ſee. Miniſtry had but very indifferent forces in America, ſince Admiral Howe was there far inferior to Count D'Eſtaing, who nevertheleſs had but twelve ſhips of the line, which obliged General Clinton to evacuate Philadelphia, &c. Miniſtry ſtood in need of much time to enable them to ſend Admiral Byron with only twelve ſhips of the line, and thoſe *but indifferent ſailors*, to run after and track the Count D'Eſtaing. In ſhort, when Admiral Keppel went to review the fleet, to the command of which he had juſt been appointed, he did not find twelve ſhips fit to put to ſea; nor was it but with immenſe labour, continued day and night, that

after four months they were able to furniſh him thirty ſhips to withſtand the French fleet in the ocean. Such was the ſtate of the forces Miniſtry had on foot at the time of the treaty between France and the Americans. I now aſk, how would the caſe have ſtood with England, if ſhe had had to encounter, not with the united powers of all Europe, as the Miniſters fondly talked, but only with the united forces of France and Spain?

What reaſons could the Miniſters have for keeping the forces of England in ſuch a ſtate of debility? Did they think to frighten all Europe with bombaſtic phraſes, and threatening words? Did they take all the Powers in Europe for a flock of timorous birds that ſuffer themſelves to be ſcared with a parcel of rags hung out in a field? Once more, how can this ſecurity or neglect of Miniſters be juſtified? Will they ſay that Parliament denied them the ſubſidies they demanded? They cannot ſay ſo, ſince Parliament conſtantly granted them a million of pounds ſterling over and above the ſums propoſed for the ſervice of the State. Will they ſay they

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truſted to the aſſurances of France and Spain, concerning the intentions of both to continue at peace with England? But they could not be ignorant that before the breaking-out of the late war, the Britiſh Miniſters had often made the ſame proteſtations, whilſt they availed themſelves of all opportunities to deſtroy the naval power and trade of France. The preſent Miniſters, therefore, knew by experience what credit might be given to thoſe kinds of proteſtations. They knew that, notwithſtanding thoſe proteſtations, France and Spain were building and fitting out fleets with the utmoſt diſpatch in all their ports: they knew that France had connections with the Americans; they knew that a thouſand incidents in America might happen to determine France to declare in favour of the Americans: they knew that *ſo early as the end of the year* 1776, *and the beginning of* 1777, *France had brought together in its ports of Breſt and Toulon ſailors requiſite for the manning of its fleets*; which was a plain indication it was on the point of declaring war againſt England; all which they knew, or at leaſt ought to have known. And it was

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at that very time they remained in the greateſt ſecurity; it was at that time they kept on foot no forces capable of oppoſing thoſe which France was able to bring into action at a moment's warning; it was at that time they contented themſelves with uttering oſtentatious rodomontades. Once more I aſk, how can ſuch conduct be juſtified?

But the Miniſters now ſay, if we had but few forces able to act when France made a treaty with the Americans, it was becauſe the fire at Portſmouth had burnt all our ſails, all our cordage, all materials neceſſary for their manufactory. Let us examine the validity of this anſwer. It well deſerves it; and it ſo much the more deſerves to be ſcrutinized, as no one has hitherto anſwered it. Let us allow this anſwer all the validity poſſible, and by allowing it all the validity poſſible, we ſhall be ſtill better acquainted with the abſurdity of it.

In the firſt place, the damage cauſed by the fire at Portſmouth was eſtimated at but ſixty thouſand pounds ſterling: it is not, therefore,

fore, likely that England ſhould have loſt on that occaſion all the ſail-cloth, all the cordage, neceſſary for the fitting out its fleets; and England has other ports, other ſtore-houſes, in which a very great quantity ought to have been found. But ſuppoſing that all was conſumed by that conflagration, that is certainly not enough to juſtify the Miniſters, as we ſhall preſently ſee; on the contrary, it is ſufficient to draw upon them the heavieſt reproaches.

The fire at Portſmouth happened in the month of December 1776. Every circumſtance at that time laid the Miniſters under the ſtricteſt obligation of haſtening to fill their ſtore-houſes and arſenals with all ſuch materials as had been conſumed by the flames; every thing pointed out the neceſſity of having forces in readineſs to act at the firſt ſignal.

From the period of that conflagration to the month of March 1778, when France intimated to England her treaty with the Americans, above ſixteen months elapſed. Holland preſented the Miniſters with immenſe ſtores, where they might have found abundantly,

dantly, both the materials neceſſary for making ſails and tackling, &c. and thoſe very ſails and tackling ready manufactured, if they had pleaſed. It was therefore in their power to have ſpeedily repaired the damage cauſed by the fire; and every thing, as I have juſt ſaid, laid them under the ſtricteſt obligation of doing ſo; yet they did not do it.

From the time of the fire to that of the notifying the treaty with the Americans, was, as I have already obſerved, a period of above ſixteen months. Thoſe ſixteen months were more than ſufficient to fetch from the North all the materials conſumed by the fire, and to manufacture the ſails and tackling requiſite for the ſervice of the fleets; ſince in the ſpace of four months a ſufficient quantity was manufactured for the equipment of the fleets of Admirals Byron and Keppel. The Miniſters ought, therefore, to have had their fleets in readineſs to act, as ſoon as France had ſignified to England her treaty with the Americans. However, they had then no fleet in a condition to put to ſea; and it is owing to its being taken thus unawares, that England

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afterwards experienced ſo many checks and repulſes. Let us proceed farther.

Long before 1776 and 1777, the Miniſters were not ignorant of the connection between France and the Americans: Lord Stormont had often raiſed the ſhrilleſt outcry on that ſubject; he was continually preſenting the alternative to the French Miniſtry. Who would not have thought, after that, that England's Miniſters held in readineſs forces ſufficient to cruſh the naval power of France, if ſhe refuſed the ſatisfaction they demanded? And yet at that very time they let their ſhips lie and rot in their harbours; at that very time they had laid up in the arſenals and ſtore-houſes all the ſhip-rigging, with the riſk of ſeeing them conſumed by a conflagration a hundred ways poſſible, with the riſk of lying intirely at the mercy of France, if it had then declared againſt England. Let us proceed.

The greater the complaiſance the French Miniſters ſeemed to ſhew to the peeviſh clamours of Lord Stormont, the more ought

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the Britiſh Miniſters to have judged that ſuch a power as France muſt be incenſed to ſee itſelf thus harraſſed at home, and moleſted even in the ſmalleſt operations with reſpect to its trade; the more ought the Britiſh Miniſters to have judged, that ſuch a power as France would, with all poſſible warmth, labour, as it was in reality doing, and would ſeize the firſt opportunity, to quiet for ever ſuch clamours, and avenge itſelf of the dictatorial airs of Lord Stormont; conſequently the more ought the Britiſh Miniſters to have been ſenſible of the neceſſity of having always ready, forces capable of acting vigorouſly againſt France at the firſt ſignal: yet that was the time when they let their ſhips lie and rot, and that they, &c. How this conduct can be juſtified I know not. But it is to this wiſe, ſteady, and provident conduct of her Miniſters, that England this day owes the condition ſhe is in, and the multitude of enemies which overwhelm her. Their underſtanding, their deep penetration, maintained the ſame tenor in the operations ſubſequent to theſe ſamples of their abilities, as I will preſently demonſtrate, by comparing the operations then ſuited to the

intereſt

intereſt of England, with thoſe which the Miniſters actually adopted and carried into execution.

Miniſtry cannot have been ignorant that Count D'Eſtaing was ſet out ſo early as March 1778, to go to Toulon, and take upon him the command of a fleet there fitting out with all poſſible diſpatch. I grant they might be unacquainted with the deſtination of that fleet, though there was not a perſon but was informed of it, though every thing then doing muſt have informed them of the real deſtination of that fleet. But this ignorance on their part ought to have directed them to the only two operations ſuitable to the intereſt of England; and the fewer forces they had in a condition to act, the more indiſpenſible was it for them to turn their thoughts to thoſe operations, ſince with feeble means they might hope to determine the war in their own favour by a ſingle blow.

The former of thoſe operations would have been, to ſend into the Mediterranean a fleet at leaſt equal to that which Count

D'Eſtaing was to command. Will they ſay, they had not time enough? Every body knows that Count D'Eſtaing ſet out for Toulon early in March 1778; every body knows that he ſtayed there near two months before that fleet was fitted out, and in a condition to put to ſea; every body knows that his paſſage was very difficult, and that he was ſix weeks before he got through the Streights. Were not four months or thereabouts more than ſufficient for the Engliſh fleets to ſail into the Mediterranean?

Had Miniſtry ſent into the Mediterranean a fleet to obſerve and fight Count D'Eſtaing at his ſailing out of Toulon, and we have juſt ſeen they had much more time than they needed to do it in; we have juſt ſeen that the uncertainty they were in concerning the deſtination of M. D'Eſtaign's fleet, laid them under an indiſpenſible neceſſity of ſo doing; in ſuppoſition even that the Engliſh fleet had been barely equal to that of Count D'Eſtaign, which it was well known was not to exceed twelve ſhips of the line; whatever had been the upſhot of that fight, England could not

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but be highly benefited, without a poſſibility of any miſchief reſulting from it; which is what we muſt demonſtrate.

If M. D'Eſtaign had been beaten, from thenceforward the war was determined in favour of England. The loſs of that battle would have deprived the Americans of the ſuccours they expected from their new Ally, which would certainly have damped their courage; the loſs of that battle would have checked all the powers in Europe, and thrown France into the greateſt embarraſſment, eſpecially if Miniſtry had known how to avail themſelves, with any degree of underſtanding, of the ſituation the affairs of Europe were then in, as I have ſhewn in the Memorial I have publiſhed.

Every thing concurred in favour of England on this occaſion. Monſ. D'Eſtaing's orders were to ſail to America; in conſequence of which he would have endeavoured to decline the engagement, which greatly perplexes a General when in ſuch a circumſtance he is obliged to give battle. The ſhips

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of M. D'Eſtaing were laden with great quantities of all kinds of ſtores, both for his own uſe, and for the ſervice of the Americans; which would have impeded the manœuvres. Theſe two circumſtances would neceſſarily have greatly diminiſhed the vivacity of the encounter on his part; while the Britiſh fleet, ſubject to none of thoſe inconveniences, could manœuvre and fight with eaſe, and draw from the combat all poſſible advantages, every thing concurring to inſure its ſucceſs.

If Count D'Eſtaing had gained an advantage in that engagement, he could not have greatly improved his victory, as I have been ſhewing; and the Britiſh fleets would have found an aſylum in Minorca, or even Gibraltar. In that poſition what could M. D'Eſtaing have done? As it is unqueſtionable but that his fleet muſt have ſuffered much from the violence of the conflict; either he would have been obliged to ſail back to Toulon with his whole fleet, in order to refit; and then the Miniſters of England would have had time to ſend reinforcements to the beaten fleet, to enable it to renew the fight, whenever Count

D'Eſtaing

D'Eſtaing had ſailed a ſecond time from Toulon, to execute the operations he had in charge: or M. D'Eſtaing would have purſued his voyage, and contented himſelf with ſending back to Toulon the crippled and diſabled ſhips, which would have weakened him conſiderably; and it would then have been a very eaſy matter to meet him with a fleet able to ſtop him, and which by a ſecond fight, whatever had been the ſucceſs of it, would have prevented his proceeding in his operations. There would then have reſulted to England all the advantages I took notice of before. Such was the firſt operation neceſſity ſhould have pointed out to Miniſters of the ſmalleſt ſagacity; ſuch would have been its effects. Let us paſs on to the ſecond operation they might have made uſe of, in lieu of the former, and whence they could have reaped the greateſt advantages.

Miniſtry were ignorant of the deſtination of Count D'Eſtaing's fleet, though no one elſe was ſo; though every tranſaction ought to have convinced them of that deſtination. Let us overlook this ignorance of theirs: we

muſt needs ſhew them ſome indulgence; greatly do they ſtand in need of it. But they are obliged to own they had nothing to fear from M. D'Eſtaing for the Eaſt-Indies, ſince the Eaſt-India Company had ſent orders, as early as the month of March, to ſeize upon all the French ſettlements in thoſe regions; ſo that M. D'Eſtaing, on his arrival in the Eaſt-Indies, would not have found an inch of ground to land upon, which would have made it impoſſible for him to perform any thing. Miniſtry had in like manner nothing to apprehend for the Weſt-Indies, becauſe the ſeaſon was too far advanced to allow M. D'Eſtaing to undertake any thing, ſuppoſing ſuch to have been his deſtination, though there was not the leaſt appearance of its being ſo. There remained then nothing but to watch for the ſecurity of the Engliſh armies and fleets in America, which were in a very precarious ſituation; there remained therefore nothing but to hinder the Americans from receiving ſuccours from their new Ally. It behoved the Miniſters, therefore, in that poſition, inſtead of ſending Admiral Byron to follow and trace M. D'Eſtaign, as

they

they did; it behoved them to ſend him ſtraight to New-York, which place he might have made long before M. D'Eſtaing could have reached America. From that period the General who commanded in America, having nothing to dread from the enterpriſes of Count D'Eſtaing, would have preſerved Philadelphia, the Jerſeys, &c. and might have hoped to carry on his operations ſucceſsfully. From that period Admiral Byron, enabled to augment his fleet with part of that of Admiral Howe, would have been in a condition to face Count D'Eſtaing, when he had heard of his arrival. In this ſituation how many the advantages in favour of Admiral Byron! *How painful and perplexing a ſituation for M. D'Eſtaing!* Count D'Eſtaing, charged with a commiſſion which he had orders to execute, coſt what it might; Count D'Eſtaing, wearied with a tedious and toilſome paſſage, could have engaged but feebly; whilſt Admiral Byron, with ſuperior ſtrength, no obſtacle to impede him, having no other object than the deſtruction of the French fleet, would have fought with the greateſt eaſe, as well as fury. Every thing concurred,

in theſe circumſtances, to inſure a complete victory to Admiral Byron, of which the conſequences would have been as follow.

If Count D'Eſtaing had been beaten, his miſſion was fruſtrated; his fleet would have been deſtroyed without reſource; and, inſtead of his carrying ſuccours to the Americans, he would have appeared before them in the moſt deplorable ſtate, in the moſt diſcouraging one to them: he would have been obliged to ſollicit powerful ſuccours from the Americans, which they would have been unable to afford him, or which they perhaps would have been far from affording him in thoſe circumſtances, even though they had been able.

If Count D'Eſtaing had been beaten under the eyes of the Americans, the war had been ended in favour of England: the Americans would have fallen into deſpair; no power in Europe would have declared for France; and France, in the then ſituation of the affairs of Europe, would have been in the greateſt

dilemma,

dilemma, had the Miniſters known how to avail themſelves of it; as I have already obſerved.

If Count D'Eſtaing had been beaten, France would not have been able to ſend a freſh fleet to America; and conſequently muſt have forſaken the Americans, which, in my opinion, would have diſpoſed them to a reconciliation with the Mother country.

If Count D'Eſtaing, contrary to all appearances, had gained the advantage in that engagement, he would have been little the better for it: his poſition and his deſtination would have hindered his improving his victory: he would have been neceſſitated to ſail into ſome American harbour, where he would have appeared in a very ſhattered condition, from the violence of the fight he had juſt been engaged in, and where he would have needed great aſſiſtance from them. Whereas Admiral Byron, by retreating to New-York, might eaſily have refitted, and been reinforced by the remainder of Admiral Howe's fleet. By this means Admiral Byron would have been enabled to ſail out again, meet M. D'Eſtaing,

and fight him a ſecond time, when he had been obliged to leave the American ports: by this manœuvre Admiral Byron would have been maſter of the American ſeas, and afforded a facility to the Commander of the Britiſh armies to continue his operations unmoleſted: by this manœuvre Admiral Byron would, no doubt, have completed the deſtruction of the French fleet, in a ſecond engagement; which would have produced all the effects I before mentioned.

Theſe two operations were very ſimple, very natural, very ſubſtantial; they were the dictate of neceſſity: yet the Miniſters did not ſo much as bethink themſelves of them; they let M. D'Eſtaing quietly ſail from Toulon, croſs the Mediterranean, paſs the Streights of Gibraltar, and purſue his voyage without throwing the leaſt obſtacle in his way; after which, like children that run after a bird they have let looſe, they ſent Admiral Byron on the track of Count D'Eſtaing, though there was a phyſical impoſſibility of overtaking him before he had fulfilled his orders; which rendered the operations of Admiral Byron abſolutely fruitleſs.

What enſued from this blunder? The conſequence was, that General Clinton, fearful of ſeeing Count D'Eſtaing fall on ſome of his poſts, was obliged to evacuate Philadelphia, &c. — the conſequence was, that, notwithſtanding his ability, and the valour of his troops, he was on the point of experiencing the fate of General Burgoyne, had it not been for a fault, with which one of the American Commanders is taxed, of abandoning a poſt, the defence of which would have proved the greateſt obſtacle to the retreat of the Engliſh army, &c.

Every body knows, that, had M. D'Eſtaing been able to ſail eight days ſooner up the Delaware, he would have entirely ruined and deſtroyed the Engliſh fleet and ſhipping that were in that river; which would have involved the loſs of the whole army. Every one knows, that, had M. D'Eſtaing been able to ſtop four days longer before New-York, he would have intercepted the convoy which was bringing from Europe the reinforcements and ammunition for the army, the loſs of which would have reduced it to the laſt extremities.

Such

Such has been the result of the well-planned operations of the Miniſtry! and, if England did not ſink, at the firſt moments of the war with France, is it to their foreſight and wiſdom,—is it to the propriety of their meaſures, ſhe is indebted for it? No, certainly; ſhe owes it to chance—ſhe owes it to a tempeſt. Let any one now judge what would have reſulted to Britain, had the Miniſtry put in practice the operations I have been ſpeaking of, had the Miniſtry acted with the ſmalleſt degree of underſtanding and reſolution; ſince, without having performed any operation of the leaſt importance whatever, France nevertheleſs ſaw itſelf encompaſſed with very great difficulties at the end of the campaign of 1778. Let it be recollected in what a ſituation M. D'Eſtaing then was.

And how, after this, do the Miniſtry, endeavour to exculpate themſelves? They publiſh a memorial of above a hundred pages, filled with idle ſtories, in which Lord Stormont emphatically deals out a heap of news, ſuch as are propagated in the Gardens of the *Palais Royal*

Royal at Paris, under the tree of *Cracovia*,* to evince his own vigilance when he was in France; and every body laughed at the faſtidious memorial: while in four pages, penned with underſtanding and diſcernment, they might have had every body on their ſide. What more do Miniſters ſay in that memorial? Like children, they cry out *perfidiouſneſs* againſt France, while they were inceſſantly provoking that power; while, if there was any perfidiouſneſs on the part of France, there is not a nation on earth, ancient or modern, to which the ſame reproach might not be made on the like occaſion; while England itſelf is no more clear of it than the reſt; while what they call perfidiouſneſs, has always been juſtified by ſtate policy; while in ſhort ..... But I ſtop, and that out of diſcretion; for what I might ſay more would be of the greateſt prejudice to England, eſpecially in the preſent circumſtances. My only ſurpriſe is, that what I could ſay on that head, has eſcaped the well-known and acknowledged ſagacity

* A place where people who are at a loſs how to ſpend their time, meet to amuſe one another with idle tales.

ſagacity of the Count de Vergennes, Miniſter in the foreign Department in France.—Such are the deſpicable methods they take to endeavour to blind the nation, and exculpate themſelves for their blundering proceedings. Let us now come to the operations of the campaign in 1779.

So early as the month of December 1778, ſo early as the beginning of the year 1779, the operations of France plainly indicated that ſhe was aſſured of the aſſiſtance of Spain, and that Spain was determined to declare war againſt England. Had Lord Stormont been the leaſt acquainted with France, it was impoſſible he ſhould doubt of a truth ſo clearly obvious. Yet above four months after, Lord Stormont ſtrongly cenſures thoſe ſagacious Members of Parliament who dared to impart this piece of intelligence to the nation, that it might provide againſt ſuch an event. Lord Stormont runs out into the moſt pompous encomiums of the aſſurances given by Spain of its intentions to live in amity with England. Lord Stormont brings a very heavy charge againſt whoever dares to doubt of the ſincerity of thoſe aſſu-

rances ;

rances; he requires the profoundeſt ſilence on that ſubject: ſo clear-ſighted is Lord Stormont, ſo penetrating!

Three months after this pompous parade, the Miniſter from Spain declares war againſt England, in the name of the King his Maſter. Lord North is commiſſioned to carry this piece of news to Parliament, whither he repairs with the moſt chearful, the moſt pleaſant look, as if he carried to that auguſt aſſembly the moſt agreeable piece of news that could be conveyed to it. After he had imparted this intelligence, a Member of the houſe reproaches him with his air of gaiety, and tells him he ſees nothing very gladdening in this communication. Lord North anſwers him, That he is ſorry to ſee him afflict himſelf about it; *but that every one has his way of ſeeing things.* Very fine, my Lord, extremely fine from the mouth of a Prime Miniſter! Who, after that, would not think you had long ſince taken your meaſures againſt that event? Who would not have thought that you then had means in your power to make Spain repent of the ſteps ſhe had taken?

I believe that was the only idea which your air of merriment could excite; which otherwiſe would have ſavoured of *inſanity*. Now let us ſee what were the means you were poſſeſſed of, to make Spain repent of the ſtep ſhe had taken; let us behold your conduct and operations in this occurrence.

The French fleet ſails from Breſt to the coaſt of Spain, to effect a junction with the Spaniards; and the Miniſters provide no forces to fight the French fleet before that junction. Yet that was undoubtedly the moment, and a moment very precious to be ſeized upon. Let us go on. The French Admiral is obliged to wait a long time for the Spaniſh fleet, and ſickneſs prevails amongſt the crews of the French fleet; a fact known to all Europe; and Miniſters do not lay hold of this circumſtance, to cauſe that fleet to be attacked! Yet they then had a fleet ſuperior to that of France, and knew that, after the union of the combined fleets, that of England would be greatly inferior to them. Why did they delay then, to order the French fleet to be attacked? Was not every circumſtance

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in their favour? There is therefore no occaſion to ſay, what they ceaſe not to ſay, That it is the French fleets which avoid thoſe of England. Here is an inſtance when they could not poſſibly avoid them. Why did they not ſeize the opportunity? It certainly was a very favourable one for the Engliſh fleet.

Contemplating this inaction, after the air of mirth with which Lord North had made known to Parliament the declaration of war by Spain againſt England, every body was inclined to think, I myſelf thought, that the Miniſters had, in ſome unknown receſs, conſiderable forces, which they were going to bring forth to fight ſtrenuouſly, and deſtroy at one blow the combined forces of France and Spain; to that I attributed the joyful looks of Lord North, and imagined that that event would ſhortly raiſe him to the pinacle of glory. But I did not long remain in error.

We were ſoon informed that the Engliſh fleet under the command of Admiral Hardy, become much inferior to the combined fleets,

was obliged to yield the ſea to them, and retire; we were ſoon informed of the combined fleets entering the Channel, and appearing before Plymouth. There is not this day a man in England who does not confeſs that Plymouth was then deſtitute of every means of defence, and that, had the French Admiral attacked it, he would have met with no reſiſtance; that he might have deſtroyed all there was in the harbour, and that the ſtores would have become a prey to the flames; which would have proved an irreparable detriment to England. No one, I ſay, queſtions the truth of this. How can ſuch a neglect in the Miniſters be juſtified, at a time when England was threatened with an invaſion from France? at a time when the Miniſters had drawn out all the Militia in England to guard againſt that event?.

If the French Admiral did not execute that operation, however eaſy it might be, Lord North and the other Miniſters have no reaſon to avail themſelves of that incident, in order to aſſume to themſelves any glory from it: neither to their foreſight nor ſkill did that town owe its ſafety.

If the French Admiral did not execute that operation, it was becauſe he was hindered by very prevalent reaſons. As no man can call in queſtion the courage and ſkill of Count D'Orvilliers, his inactivity at ſo intereſting a moment ought to have opened people's eyes concerning the motives that occaſioned it. Thoſe motives were not hard to gueſs at; nay, more, they were ſufficiently public. Had the Miniſters been endued with the leaſt clear-ſightedneſs, with the leaſt penetration, it was eaſy for them to perceive that the reaſons which hindered Count D'Orvilliers from undertaking any thing, made it apparent he was not in a condition to ſuſtain an engagement. Every thing, therefore, ought to have induced the Miniſters to order a vigorous attack. The conſideration for that moment was not the ſuperiority of the combined fleets; it was their ſituation, it was ..... but I am forced to ſay no more.

Are there not a thouſand circumſtances in which inferior forces may promiſe themſelves ſure ſucceſs over very ſuperior ones? Is not the fight at Camden a very recent inſtance

of

of it? And if ever there was a moment when ſuperiority of numbers was of no avail; if ever there was a moment when ſuperiority of numbers proved very perplexing; it was that in which Count D'Orvilliers retired from before Plymouth. I repeat it; Count D'Orvilliers, by retreating from before Plymouth without making any enterpriſe, very plainly ſignified that many were the reaſons which diſabled him from maintaining a fight. That was therefore the moment for attacking him with vigour. But if I am aſked, why Count D'Orvilliers, not being in a condition to engage, yet preſented himſelf before Plymouth? among ſeveral reaſons I could adduce, I ſhall content myſelf with ſaying, it was becauſe the Miniſters of France ſufficiently knew the penetration and vigour of genius in the Britiſh Miniſters, to dread nothing from them.

. . . . . .

If the Engliſh fleet had attacked the combined fleets, and had gained the ſmalleſt advantage over them, as every thing concurred to inſure that ſucceſs to the Britiſh Admiral; the moſt melancholy conſequences would have reſulted to the combined fleets in the poſition

poſition they were in, having no port to ſhelter themſelves in. Had the Britiſh fleet been beaten, its ports were open to receive it; and the ſame motives which obliged the French Admiral to retire without undertaking any thing, would have hindered him from purſuing his victory. There could not then reſult from this operation any diſadvantage to England in caſe of ill ſucceſs, while the leaſt ſucceſs would have been productive of events the moſt advantageous and favourable to it; would perhaps have ſet at variance for ever the newly-allied powers, who would not have failed to charge their overthrow reciprocally on each other.

So reſolute a blow, whatever had been the ſucceſs of it, would have revived the courage of the nation, done the greateſt honour to England throughout Europe and other parts of the world, and inſpired its well-wiſhers with new warmth in its behalf. Yet Miniſtry did not even think of this; and ſatisfied, like children, with having eſcaped a danger which they had not in the leaſt guarded againſt, they have raiſed a trophy, as if the

ſafety

ſafety of their country was owing to their ſkill and to the vigour of their operations — as if they were not to be reſponſible for having expoſed their country to the greateſt dangers; as if they were not to be reſponſible for having miſſed an opportunity the moſt favourable of ſerving their country eſſentially.

What reſulted from this conduct on the part of the Miniſters? It is well known to every one, that it was the effect of mere chance that the Weſt-India fleet of merchantmen reached the Britiſh ports; and yet the loſs of that fleet would have thrown the nation into deſolation and the utmoſt diſtreſs. The Spaniards have made themſelves maſters of ſeveral Engliſh ſettlements; Count D'Eſtaing has taken Grenada; he has defeated the Britiſh fleets in ſuch a manner that his victory is uncontroverted; and, after making himſelf maſter of the Weſt-Indian ſeas, he has prepared to go and fall upon America.

General Clinton, knowing that the Admiral who commanded the Britiſh fleets in America was unable to withſtand Count D'Eſtaing,

and

and apprehenſive of ſeeing the latter fall upon ſome poſt of his, was obliged to evacuate Rhode Iſland. Such have been the events of this campaign. Were theſe the events Lord North foreſaw, when with ſo gay, ſo pleaſant a look, he imparted to Parliament the declaration of war on the part of Spain? Were theſe the reaſons that induced him to make anſwer, with pride and deriſion, to a Member of Parliament, who did not behold that declaration of war with ſo pleaſant an eye, that *every one had his way of ſeeing things?* Own, my Lord, that you ſaw very ill, and do ſee very ill; or elſe own that you are very indifferent to the moſt melancholy events. Let us come on to the operations of laſt year, 1780.

In the earlier part of this year a well-informed Member of Parliament gives intelligence that Ruſſia is forming a formidable league in behalf of the Neutral Powers; which league cannot but prove very prejudicial to the intereſts of Great-Britain, and bring great advantage to France and Spain. Lord Stormont, who in 1779 had judged

with ſo much penetration of the deſigns of Spain, again takes upon him to ſpeak at this conjuncture: he bitterly cenſures the well-informed Member who imparts this intereſting event to the Houſe; he maintains that he is miſtaken; he maintains it is a crime to dare to ſuſpect Ruſſia of ſuch a project, though it was already very public; he gives the moſt poſitive aſſurances of the good intentions of Ruſſia towards Britain; ſo well-informed, ſo clear-ſighted, is his Lordſhip! He thinks ſuch a piece of information to the Houſe wrongs his penetration, wrongs his abilities; to which he requires the moſt implicit confidence ſhould be given. He next enjoins the ſtricteſt ſilence on every thing reſpecting his department. In ſhort, he imagines that with big words, that with pompous eulogiums, interſperſed with a few fawning expreſſions, he ſhall make Ruſſia alter its reſolution. What comes to paſs?

The Northern confederacy goes on nevertheleſs; it aſſumes all poſſible conſiſtence; and in purſuance of it Ruſſia ſends out a fleet of ſeventeen or eighteen ſhips of the line.

That

That fleet comes and dares the Engliſh in their own dominions; that fleet comes and anchors ſeveral days in the Downs. Since the high encomiums and coaxing ſpeeches of Lord Stormont had not converted Ruſſia, what was left for Miniſtry to do? It was to improve that circumſtance; it was to loſe not one moment, as I ſaid in my Memorial on that ſubject, to deſtroy or make themſelves maſters of that fleet*.

Inſtead of that operation, what meaſure was adopted? The Officers of the Ruſſian

* I know it has been ſaid of the Memorial I publiſhed on that ſubject, that I ſpoke after knowledge, becauſe that operation had been propoſed in the public papers. To be convinced I did not derive my information on that head from the public papers, a perſon need only to ſee, 1ſt, the date of my Letter to Lord Stormont, in which I announced that Memorial to his Lordſhip; 2dly, it is ſufficient to obſerve, that I ſaid in the Memorial, as again I repeat, "*That it would have been very eaſy afterwards not only to appeaſe Ruſſia, but even to bring it over to the intereſt of Great-Britain.*" It was on that principle I had particularly calculated the operation. If people are ignorant of the means of accompliſhing that object, it is no fault of mine; but, for my part, I know them well, nor does their ignorance render the means leſs certain.

fleet were feaſted, were careſſed; great entertainments were made for them, and their fleet was quietly ſuffered to depart, the diviſions of which went and took their ſtations, one in the Mediterranean, another in the Ocean, and a third in the Baltic; ſo that they find themſelves able in all thoſe ſeas to cruſh the trade of Britain, ſhould Britain mean to give the leaſt moleſtation to the Ruſſian trade of what kind ſoever.

This diſpoſition of the Ruſſian ſquadrons has at length juſt now opened the eyes of the Miniſters, and particularly Lord Stormont's; who, as he now foreſees all the conſequences, has iſſued the moſt poſitive orders to the Privateers, to reſpect all veſſels under the Ruſſian flag; he has ordered them not to be ſearched but with all poſſible caution and regard; he has very diſtinctly ſpecified all articles ſuſceptible of ſeizure, and among all thoſe articles not a word is mentioned of Naval ſtores.

The grand queſtion is, therefore, at length determined! Ruſſia, and all the Neutral Powers

Powers that have acceded to the Treaty for the mutual protection of their trade, have then a right now to carry into the ports of the enemies of Great-Britain all the Naval ſtores they may have need of! for, if Britain ſhould attempt to moleſt one of the Powers on that point, Ruſſia, and the reſt of the Powers that have acceded to the Neutrality, would not fail to take its part, and avenge it. Holland, whether it does or does not accede to the aforeſaid treaty, can then freely now carry on that trade with France and Spain! for by what right could the Engliſh undertake now to moleſt the Dutch Merchants in that reſpect? If they ſhould be moleſted, has not Holland an infallible method of guarding them from all inſults by acceding to the treaty of Neutrality? And is it not better that an ancient Ally of Britain ſhould reap the benefit of that trade, than to leave it in the hands of other Powers*?

* All this was written before the laſt operations of Lord Stormont againſt Holland. I did not think I ought to make any alteration, becauſe it is eaſy now to judge of its juſtice, and of the regularity of Lord Stormont's new plan of operations. All that I can aſſert, is, that theſe laſt operations of Lord Stormont conſtitute the glory and the juſtification of the enemies of Great-Britain. All that I can aſſert, is, that .....

Hitherto England with good reaſon conſidered, that her ſafety depended on the prohibiting to tranſport naval ſtores to the enemies ports: and now, behold that conveyance not only tolerated, but openly allowed, by the laſt ordinance of Lord Stormont!* It is eaſy, I believe, to perceive what the conſequence will be. Such is the foreſight, ſuch are the operations, of Lord Stormont. Does he not with reaſon require people to be paſſive, and let him act? Paſſive one muſt be, and extremely paſſive, to feel, without murmuring, the effects of ſuch operations. Let us go forwards with the operations of 1780.

England puts to ſea a conſiderable fleet. What does that fleet perform? It goes and lies rotting before Breſt, and ſuffers one of the richeſt and largeſt convoys that had been ſent during the whole war, either to the Eaſt or Weſt-Indies, or for victualling and reinforcing the iſlands, to be taken.

When a Member with ſome aſperity mentions this loſs in the Houſe, Lord Sandwich, firſt

† That ordinance is of the 2d of Nov. 1780.

firſt Lord of the Admiralty, anſwers, that the Commander who eſcorted the convoy, punctually executed the orders given him; and that I am well convinced of. His Lordſhip ſays, that a Spaniſh Admiral owns in a letter, that it was the effect of chance, that they became maſters of the convoy. I willingly credit the authenticity of that letter, which, however, was never made public; but this is, I believe, an inſtance in which we may conſider as ſuſpicious the praiſes of an enemy, and the apologies he frames in our behalf.

If the taking of the convoy was the work of chance, there is nothing now that may not be laid to the account of chance. The Spaniſh fleet lying at Cadiz had received advice of the arrival of the convoy in its neighbourhood; it put to ſea for no other purpoſe but to intercept that convoy; it ſailed back into harbour, and went out no more, as ſoon as it had attained it object; it did not even take the trouble to chace the men of war that eſcorted that convoy, becauſe it had operations more eſſential to perform, as we ſhall preſently

preſently ſee : If it had not fallen in with the convoy, almoſt as ſoon as it ſailed out of harbour, it would certainly have met with it a little farther on, and would equally have made a capture of it. It is then demonſtrated, that with the meaſures taken here, that convoy muſt have fallen into the enemy's hands, either a little ſooner, or a little later. In ſhort, Lord Sandwich ſaid, that the grand fleet eſcorted that convoy to a certain latitude, and that it would not have been prudent to proceed farther.

Let us examine this laſt article of Lord Sandwich's anſwer; it is well worth while. In the firſt place, he fully juſtifies the Britiſh Admiral, who of himſelf is too reſpectable to be ſuſpected of not having punctually executed the orders given him. We will now come to the orders given by Lord Sandwich to the Admiral of that fleet. In order to diſcover what thoſe orders were, let us begin by examining the project of Lord Sandwich, in ſending the Engliſh fleet to cruize before Breſt.

My

My Lord! as hitherto—and I believe one may eaſily preſage the ſame for the future—as hitherto you have always received laws dictated by your enemies; as you have always been at the fag end of their operations; as you never knew how to foreſee or prevent any; as you think, *from your own experience*, that a Miniſter can have but one ſyſtem of operations; you have imagined, *and very groundleſsly have you imagined it*, that France and Spain intended this year to unite their fleets, and come, as laſt year, to threaten the Britiſh ports. To prevent this manœuvre, my Lord, you thought you ſhould ſend a fleet off Breſt. The purpoſe of that fleet was to oppoſe the junction, to engage one of the two fleets, when it ſhould put to ſea to effect the junction; and then turn back and fall on the other. Such was the project you took care to announce with great oſtentation; ſuch was the project that your partiſans have highly extolled, that they have ſet forth as the greateſt effort of imagination, and as one of the ſeven wonders.

It would be an eaſy taſk for me, my Lord, to prove that this grand project was only fit

to throw duſt into the eyes of ſimpletons: it would be eaſy for me to prove, that, *ſuppoſing the Breſt fleet in a condition to act*, as you falſely imagined it was—that, *ſuppoſing France and Spain had had a deſign of forming a junction*, the ſucceſs of your project was abſolutely chimerical, and that *nothing but ruin to the Engliſh fleet* could be the reſult. If you do not credit me, my Lord, *I am ready to keep my word*, when you ſhall deſire it. But, if you now pretend to ſay, you had another project; vouchſafe, my Lord, to make it known; and *I pledge myſelf to the public*, to oppoſe *the madneſs* of it, *be it what it will*. Now let us ſee what were the orders you had given to the Britiſh Admiral, for the execution of the project I have been ſpeaking of, the only one that can well be attributed to you, that we may judge, whether, as you have ſaid, *it would not have been prudent* to give him orders to accompany the convoy till it was out of danger.

The Britiſh fleet, by lying before Breſt, obliged the fleet at Cadiz to come out, in order to join the Breſt fleet. In that poſition, what

what would the Engliſh Admiral have done? Were his orders not to engage till the Spaniſh fleet was come off of Breſt? He was then ſure of having on his hands the French fleet, at the moment he was preparing to fight the Spaniſh, which, I believe, would have brought him into ſufficient danger to oblige him to lead his fleet ſpeedily back to the coaſt of England, in the ſuppoſition he could have avoided a battle, which would have been very difficult. And you ſee, my Lord, what would have reſulted, without any need of my expatiating farther upon it.

To be able to flatter one's ſelf with any appearance of ſucceſs in the execution of your mighty project, you had then given orders to the Engliſh Admiral to go and meet the Spaniſh fleet, as ſoon as he was informed it was come out from Cadiz; conſequently it would have been not only prudent, but of abſolute neceſſity, for the Engliſh Admiral to move onwards to the Spaniſh fleet, as far as he poſſibly could, to be able to fight it at his eaſe, before the French fleet could find him freſh employment. Since that is the caſe,

caſe, my Lord, tell us now, if you pleaſe, why it would not have been prudent, as you have advanced, that the Engliſh Admiral ſhould have eſcorted the convoy till it was out of danger? If the Britiſh Admiral had orders to ſail, and meet the Spaniſh fleet when it came out of Cadiz to join the French fleet; if it would not have been not only prudent, but of abſolute neceſſity, for the Engliſh Admiral to ſail onwards, as far as he poſſibly could, to promiſe himſelf ſucceſs in fighting the Spaniſh fleet, without fear of having the French fleet at the ſame time on his hands; why was it not prudent, when the ſuccours and reinforcements ſent by Government to both the Indies, when the fortunes of many private perſons required to be protected—why, I ſay, was it not prudent for the Britiſh Admiral to move onwards as far as neceſſary to put the convoy abſolutely out of danger? Unravel to us this myſtery, my Lord: What could fall out in thoſe circumſtance?

The worſt that could have happened, was, that the Spaniſh fleet, hearing of the approach

of

of the Engliſh fleet, might have come out of Cadiz, and attacked it: but ſince the Britiſh fleet had orders to meet the Spaniſh, in caſe it ſailed from Cadiz to join the fleet at Breſt; I imagine that the Britiſh fleet, protecting its convoy, would not have been much ſurpriſed to ſee the Spaniſh fleet appear.

Let us now ſuppoſe, that the Engliſh Admiral, notwithſtanding the ſkillfulneſs of his manœuvres, had not been able to defer the fight, and give the convoy time to purſue its road, and get out of danger; let us ſuppoſe that the Engliſh Admiral had been beaten; (you ſee, my Lord, that I ſtate things at the worſt;) is it not certain, that, during the engagement, which no doubt would have been a ſmart one, and have laſted a conſiderable time—is it not certain, I ſay, that the convoy would then have had time to ſail away, and get out of danger of being overtaken by the Spaniſh fleet? Is it not certain, that at leaſt the greater part of that convoy would have eſcaped?

But, if the Engliſh fleet had beaten the Spaniſh, the greateſt advantages might have reſulted

reſulted to Britain, ſince, at the ſame blow, Gibraltar might have been relieved, as it had been by Admiral Rodney the preceding year, and a convoy ſaved, one of the moſt important that England had ſent out ſince the commencement of the preſent war.

You ſee, my Lord, that, making the very worſt of things, this operation would have proved very advantageous to England, ſince at leaſt the greateſt part of the convoy would have been preſerved by it. You ſee all the advantages that would have ariſen, if the Britiſh fleet had defeated the Spaniſh. You ceaſe not, my Lord, to ſay, that the Enemy conſtantly endeavour to avoid you: if ſo, what had your Lordſhip to fear from the operation I have been ſpeaking of? You might therefore, and certainly you might at this time, *have gone and provoked them with impunity*; for they had other objects more important than that of coming to attack you, as you are going to ſee. But you know not, neither did you ever know, how to diſcover their deſigns. Yet you are the wonder of the preſent day, my Lord, though for theſe five

years

years paſt I to no purpoſe ſeek for the *ſhadow* of a ſingle exploit you can boaſt of, while I can mention a great number *that prove your emptineſs and inſufficiency.*

Had you known, my Lord, how to judge of the operations of France and Spain during the courſe of this campaign, you would have ſeen that the one I have been ſpeaking of was not attended with the leaſt danger; you would have known that the object of thoſe Powers in Europe was ſolely to guard the Streights of Gibraltar; and that, if the Spaniſh fleet had put to ſea on hearing of the arrival of the Engliſh fleet in its neighbourhood, it certainly would have been only to fight it, in caſe it had attempted to enter the Streights; and that it would not have ventured coming to an engagemnet, on any other occaſion. For this reaſon it did not amuſe itſelf with purſuing the men of war that eſcorted the convoy, fearing to loſe time and weaken itſelf by that purſuit. You thereby ſee, that the convoy would have peaceably continued its voyage, without the leaſt uneaſineſs or danger: you ſee that the Spaniſh

fleet

fleet would not have thought of attacking the Engliſh fleet.

As to the French fleet, my Lord, I believe you are well aſſured at preſent, *as you ought to have been before*, that it would have remained quiet at Breſt: for ſince it made no motion to ſail after the Engliſh Admiral when he eſcorted the convoy to a certain latitude, though ignorant of his real deſign, it would not have put itſelf more in motion, though he had purſued his progreſs much farther. This to me ſeems fully demonſtrated. France, having afforded Spain ſufficient reinforcement to enable it to guard the Streights, was eaſy as to what might happen in thoſe ſeas.

Had you known, my Lord, how to judge of the operations of France and Spain, you would have known that laſt ſummer was the time the moſt favourable for attempting to throw ſuccours into Gibraltar; and that, having miſſed that moment, it will be very difficult for you to find again a circumſtance equally advantageous. The preſervation of Gibraltar is, however, of the greateſt importance;

portance; and the loſs of that place will certainly give the moſt ſenſible blow to the Britiſh power; a matter which ſeems at this day not ſo much as ſurmiſed: but when that place is in the hands of the Spaniards, people will not be long before they perceive whether I am in the wrong.

Permit me, my Lord, to place before your eyes the operations of France this campaign, that you may be able to compare them with your own. France ſent reinforcements to the Spaniſh fleet at Cadiz; *and you put no obſtacle to it.* France ſent conſiderable ſuccours to the Americans; *and you put no obſtacle to it,* though M. de Ternay's progreſs muſt have been very ſlow, through the immenſity of the tranſports he had to protect. France brought into the Ocean and Mediterranean the Ruſſian fleets; *and you put no obſtacle to it.* Yet you ſee, by the laſt ordinance iſſued by Lord Stormont, of what conſequence it was to ſtop them. France has brought into its own ports, and thoſe of Spain, the richeſt convoy that could poſſibly be brought into them; a convoy which thoſe

two powers ſtood greatly in need of; *and yet you put no obſtacle to it.* After all theſe operations, which, I believe, are not unimportant, France contented itſelf with having at Breſt a fleet which was only to keep you in awe, which was no more than a ſcare-crow, becauſe unable to act; *and you ſtupidly fell into the ſnare.* You ſent your fleet to be worm-eaten before Breſt; and you let the Cadiz fleet ſeize on one of the moſt important convoys that England had for a long time put to ſea. Such, my Lord, are the operations of France during this campaign; ſuch are yours. Now determine on which ſide there was underſtanding and conduct. Determine, after that, who is to have the advantage in this war. Say, my Lord, *and for once only be ſincere*—ſay, to what will the advantage of the one power over the other be imputable?

One word more concerning the convoy which France cauſed to be conveyed into Cadiz. I aſk your pardon, my Lord, but am obliged to repeat it; you have always received laws from your enemies: you never knew

knew how to foreſee or prevent any of their deſigns: you have thought, *from your own experience*, that a Miniſter could have but one ſingle ſyſtem of operations: in conſequence of which, becauſe in 1779 you ſaw Count D'Eſtaing, after having covered himſelf with glory in the Weſt-Indies, bear off to America, you judged that Count de Guichen would likewiſe ſail to America this year, after putting an end to the campaign in the Weſt-Indies; and you gave orders to Admiral Rodney to bear away to America when the campaign was ended in thoſe regions. Has not your Lordſhip taken notice, that France this year had ſent conſiderable ſuccours to the Americans, which put them in a ſituation to fear nothing from you, and that the arrival of Count de Guichen could ſcarcely be of any advantage to them? Have you not obſerved, that Spain being in want of money laſt ſummer, and having vaſt treaſures at the Havannah, it was of the greateſt conſequence for France and Spain to endeavour to convey to Europe thoſe treaſures they ſtood in the utmoſt need of? If all that, my Lord, has not been able to open yours and the reſt of the Mini-

ſtry's eyes, what was requiſite to afford you light? You ſee, my Lord, that, inſtead of ordering Admiral Rodney to bear away to America, you ought to have given him the moſt poſitive orders, not to loſe ſight, one inſtant, of the fleet under Count de Guichen, when the campaign was ended in the Weſt-Indies. You ſee, my Lord, that you ought to have ſent hence ſome ſhips to meet M. de Guichen, and might have done it, ſince your grand fleet remained in harbour from the middle of Auguſt till late in November. You ought, at leaſt, to have ſent a few frigates to diſcover him; and the advice of one of thoſe frigates might yet have proved ſerviceable. For want of the leaſt foreſight, for want of the leaſt caution, on your part, my Lord, Count de Guichen reached Cadiz, with his whole convoy, ſafe and ſound.

After all that I have been ſetting forth, is it to be wondered at, that Miniſters uſe all their oratory to repreſent their miſcarriages as trifles, not ſo much as deſerving the public notice? Hear them, hear thoſe of their party talk, the loſs of the convoy laſt Auguſt

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is one of thoſe minutiæ that do not even deſerve to be ſpoken of. You would think Miniſters meant to make a preſent of that convoy to their enemies; you would think that, having a great ſuperiority over them, the Miniſters choſe to make them a preſent of that convoy, in order to render the game more equal; you would think that, overflowing with ſpoils of their enemies, they made them a gift of that convoy, to indemnify them in part for the loſſes they had ſuſtained. Such are the ideas which Miniſters, and their party, ſeem willing to give, of one of the moſt fatal events that could happen, in the courſe of this war, to the Britiſh nation. They ceaſe not to ſtyle it *trifling, inſignificant.*

Again, it is matter of ſurpriſe, that Miniſters talk in ſo high a ſtrain of the ſmalleſt advantages, abſolutely owing to the mere ſtrength of genius and intrepidity of the Commanders of the Britiſh armies. The taking of a town appears to them an event tranſcending all that have happened in former and latter ages. The fight at Camden is extolled above the battles of Pharſalia, Poitiers, Agincourt, &c.

They

They announce theſe ſucceſſes as ſomething very extraordinary; as if it were not an impoſſibility, that in ſo extenſive a field of operation, ſkilful Generals and very brave troops ſhould not have ſome ſucceſs. One would be apt to think, from what they ſay, that thoſe ſucceſſes were owing to their abilities, though they have not the leaſt ſhare in them; one would think, in ſhort, that thoſe events were deciſive blows, which will ſhortly raiſe the nation to the ſummit of power. And what is decided by thoſe events? Nothing—abſolutely nothing.

I doubtleſs ſhould deſerve ſupreme contempt, if I attempted here to extenuate the glory of General Clinton, and Lord Cornwallis. I have been penetrated with a ſincere admiration of General Clinton, on reading the relation of his labours and operations, before and during the ſiege of Charles-town. It is impoſſible to manifeſt greater courage, reſolution, genius, ſkill, than he exhibited in thoſe two operations: his ſucceſs on ſo arduous an occaſion, and where he met with ſo great obſtacles, is an indication of what might

might be expected from ſo great a man, were he charged with operations not impracticable.

The ſame I will ſay of Lord Cornwallis: he certainly behaved like a great Commander in the action at Camden; he diſplayed on that occaſion all the reſources of genius in an able and experienced General; he is indebted for his victory to his abilities alone, and to the valour of his troops. Looking on the ſuperiority of the enemy as nothing, he knew how, with uncommon ſkill, to improve the moment, the circumſtances, the ground; he ſhewed, in the diſpoſition of his little army, the moſt profound knowledge in the art of war. Therefore, far from ſeeking to impair the glory of thoſe two Commanders, in the actions I have been ſpeaking of, I believe, that what I have ſaid of them will only make it appear in its full luſtre. What would have become, what would ſtill become of the Britiſh armies, without the abilities of two ſuch diſtinguiſhed Chiefs? If the fruits of their victories are almoſt of no effect, it is becauſe the one is almoſt deſtitute

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of the means to purſue his ſucceſs; and the other is charged with the performance of operations, in which a Deity in human ſhape would miſcarry, through their impracticability; it is becauſe he is charged with operations, which the Britiſh forces would long ſince have ſunk under, but for his ſkilfulneſs.

After the Miniſters have thus extolled the ſlighteſt ſucceſſes that attend them, let us hear them concerning the operations of their enemies. What, ſay they, have the united forces of the houſe of Bourbon performed?—thoſe forces which ſeemed as if they meant to invade the very Metropolis! what have they done? Nothing. But firſt, my Lords, here is no ſuch mighty cauſe for boaſting: you had ſpoken of them with ſo much contempt, you had announced ſuch powerful means of annihilating them as ſoon as they ſhould appear, that one might reaſonably conſider as a great token of their courage, their daring to face you, and bid defiance to your threats. Yet, what have you done againſt thoſe enemies whom you were to lay

low

low the moment they made their appearance? What have you done? Nothing, abſolutely nothing. It is your enemies then have to boaſt, not you.

But let us go over this a little again. You aſk what your enemies, with all their united forces, have done? Nothing. Good, my Lords, if you will have it ſo, I grant it. They have done nothing. But what you cannot diſown is, they have hindered you from doing any thing. What you can ſtill leſs diſown, is, that by hindering you from doing any thing, they conſume and annihilate you for ever. This, methinks, is performing no ſuch ſmall matters: there is, ſeemingly, nothing here for you to make ſuch mighty boaſt of, no cauſe to reproach them ſo bitterly with their inactivity. Tell me, I pray you, my Lords, if by this proceeding France and Spain find means to let you conſume and totally exhauſt yourſelves, is not this carrying on with you the moſt dangerous and deſtructive war your foes can wage againſt you? If they do nothing, it is you are to act; you are ſo much the more blameable for

not acting, as, after your rodomontades, it ſeems you ought to have a cheap bargain of them. Would you not have the Miniſters of France and Spain come and conſult you on what they are to do? *They are, to be ſure, in the wrong*, in not doing ſo; and I am obliged to own, that, were they to adopt that meaſure, *by following the beſt of your counſels*, their affairs would be in very bad plight, *as may be judged by your own operations.*

Your enemies, you ſay, have done nothing. Let us ſee a little, my Lords, whether you are to be credited on your bare aſſertion. But here are facts avouched. They have drawn from you all your Allies; they have rekindled, they maintain the American war; they oblige you to employ there, unavailingly, great part of your forces; they have obliged you to abandon Philadelphia, the Jerſeys, Rhode-Iſland; your poſition in that part of the world is ſo precarious, that, without the ſkill of General Clinton, you would long ſince have ſunk—that, notwithſtanding his ſkill, it is impoſſible for him to plan any enterpriſe

enterprise of consequence—and that he is every instant exposed to the greatest reverse of fortune. Your enemies have taken from you Senegal. Count D'Estaing, whom you reckoned to bring into your ports, with his whole fleet, at the beginning of 1779, not only escaped you; but, joining the most uncommon prudence to the most shining intrepidity, he began by rendering all your efforts ineffectual, when he was greatly inferior to you, and in the most critical situation; after which, he took the Grenades from you; he beat your fleets in so decisive a manner, that you did not contest it; he obliged you to shut yourselves up in your ports, and made himself absolute master of the West-Indian seas. At the same time the Spaniards took several of your settlements. Those were the operations of the campaign in 1779. In that of 1780, your enemies have lately taken a convoy of the highest importance, whatever you may say in order to lessen the opinion of that loss: your enemies have lately brought into their ports one of the richest convoys they could expect, without your putting the least obstacle to it. The arrival of that convoy,

voy, of which they were in great want, affords them the means of purſuing the war vigorouſly. Do you call all that, doing nothing? Do you call that, remaining inactive? Do you call that, flying from, and ſtriving to avoid you? *If you are inſenſible to ſuch blows*, I know not how they muſt *be dealt* to make you feel them.

Miniſtry continually ſay, and cauſe to be publiſhed, ſince the beginning of this war, That our enemies are reduced to their laſt ſhifts; that they are moneyleſs, without ſhips, &c. while England abounds in all theſe things. But beware, my Lords! by comparing the ſtate of your enemies with your own, ſuch as you repreſent them both, if you have had no advantage over your enemies, if, on the contrary, they have had very great advantages over you, you neceſſarily prove *your incapacity*, &c. you prove that . . . .

Let us now examine how conſiſtently the Miniſters and their party argue. Juſt now they ſaid, that the combined forces of France and Spain had done nothing; at preſent,

ſent, and for above ſix months paſt, they ſay, and cauſe their party to ſay, that, *during the late Parliament, people were violently bent on tormenting the Miniſters unjuſtly, on imputing to them, indiſcriminately, all the public calamities.* People were undoubtedly in the wrong, *and all the operations of the Miniſters ſpeak in their behalf.* Yet why accuſe, here, the late Parliament of having tormented Miniſtry? Was there ever a Parliament more tractable, more complaiſant to them? Did it not always content itſelf with the excuſe they never ceaſed to alledge, to juſtify their ill ſucceſs, viz. *that they were ill informed?*— an excuſe that ought to have made them loſe all kind of conſideration and confidence. Did not the old Parliament, notwithſtanding all that, ſuffer them to continue their operations, however ſmall the hopes might be of ſeeing them crowned with ſucceſs? Did not the late Parliament conſtantly grant them a million ſterling, over and above the immenſe ſubſidies they demanded? After that, can it with any appearance of truth be ſaid, that people were violently bent upon tormenting the Miniſtry? What more could Miniſtry require of the old

Parliament?

Parliament? and what more could it exact from a Parliament wholly at its devotion? Let us go on.

They ſay, *that the Houſe of Bourbon broke out at a moment when the forces of Britain were already employed, and weakened, in America.* Why, truly, the Houſe of Bourbon was in the wrong to time it ſo well, and not conſult the Britiſh Miniſters what would be the proper moment to take its reſolution!

They ſay, *France and Spain, enjoying the advantages of a long peace, choſe that inſtant of inequality to arm their combined powers.* If that were true, I ſay it again, the Houſe of Bourbon would have been in the wrong to know how to time things ſo well; it would have been to blame for not conſulting the Engliſh Miniſtry upon what it had to do: and the Miniſtry here were in the right in not being upon their guard, in letting themſelves be taken entirely at a nonplus; whilſt they ceaſed not to threaten and provoke France and Spain, if they were denied all the ſatisfaction they continually demanded with equal

haughtineſs

haughtineſs and importunity; whilſt they well knew that France and Spain were working, with unremitting activity, in their ſeveral ports, to fit out their fleets for ſervice at the firſt ſignal, &c.

But it was not thus that things fell out. Why perplex plain facts? why deceive? Sincerity is requiſite where a man labours to juſtify himſelf, and has nothing to reproach himſelf with. The whole world knows, that the Houſe of Bourbon did not ſet out by arming its combined forces: the whole world knows, that France ſingly began to bid defiance to the immenſe powers which the Miniſters had announced to Parliament with ſo much pride and parade. More than a whole year elapſed from the firſt operations of France, to the declaration of war by Spain againſt Britain; more than eighteen months paſſed, before their combined fleets acted in concert. There was time enough, therefore, to act againſt France, and make her repent her treaty with the Americans, if Miniſtry had kept on their guard, as they ought, after all that I have ſet forth. Many were the operations, as I have made apparent, which might have fulfilled

filled that end, if Miniſtry had been capable of planning a project in any degree equivalent to it. The leaſt reverſe that France had then experienced, would have thrown her into the greateſt embarraſſment; a point, I think, I have very evidently demonſtrated. The Miniſters had no more to do, than to avail themſelves, with a little underſtanding, of the ſituation the affairs of Europe were then in.

The Miniſters will, no doubt, ſay they were not acquainted with the intereſts of the Powers of the Continent. I know it; and well have they proved it, to their Country's damage. Lord Stormont, who in the month of March, 1779, had ſpoken with ſo much pride, and ſo little penetration, of the deſigns of Spain, was no better acquainted with them, than the reſt; though even at that period he aſpired to the department of foreign affairs, which he is at this day charged with. What reſults from all this? The reſult is, that Miniſters have done nothing, when they had the moſt favourable opportunity to ſave their country from the evils it this day feels, when they might eaſily have made it triumph

over

over its enemies. And were people in the wrong, will they ſtill be in the wrong, in tormenting them, and laying indiſcriminately to their account all the public calamities? It muſt be confeſſed it is a great piece of injuſtice! Let us go yet farther.

It was in the month of June, 1779, that Lord North, with a very gay and complacent look, carried to the Parliament the account of the declaration of Spain againſt England; it was at that period that he haughtily anſwered a Member who did not behold that event with ſo well-pleaſed an eye, *that every one had his way of ſeeing things.*

What, my Lord! in the month of June, 1779, you announce the rupture with Spain, with an air that ſeems to preſage that you are going to cover yourſelf with glory, and procure to your country the moſt ſignal triumphs; and then, about ten months after, you recant! you cry for mercy! What then were the motives of your mirth? But I underſtand you; you are going to ſay, that you were ill-informed. I am ſenſible, that *that noble anſwer*

from a Prime Miniſter, is concluſive againſt all the well-grounded reproaches that can be made you. It has hitherto been of ſpecial ſervice to you; and, ſince it has always been admitted, I muſt needs admit it too: it does not become me to be more difficult than other people.

But, what it is very difficult to allow to your Lordſhip, is, to hear you ſay, after all this, that it is the debates of the Oppoſition which diſcourage the nation, and encourage the Enemy. What more diſcouraging to the nation—what more encouraging to the enemy, than to hear you, my Lord, ſo ſoon make a recantation, and aſk for mercy, after having aſſumed at firſt ſo ſneering, ſo victorious an air? Yet, my Lord, how many chances in your favour, had you known how to improve them! It does not become me to particulariſe them in this place; but I know enough to be aſſured, that, if a PITT* had been at the head of Adminiſtration, far from

* I call that Great Man by the name he bore when he immortaliſed himſelf by his labours. The only weakneſs he

from recanting, far from aſking mercy, as you do, he would have crowned himſelf with glory, and procured to his country the moſt illuſtrious triumphs.

After what I have ſet forth, who without aſtoniſhment can conſider the tone of deriſion, ſelf-

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he can be reproached with, is, his having thought he had need of a title, to illuſtrate himſelf, or his family. That men as vain as they are inſufficient, who only aſcend to offices by dint of intrigue, who only ſupport themſelves in them by dint of intrigue and meanneſs, ſhould run after blue or green ribbons, ſhould heap up treaſures, court empty titles, is no matter of ſurpriſe to me. They are nothing but baſe mountebanks, that ſtand in need of all that apparatus, not to be, themſelves and their poſterity, everlaſting objects of diſguſt and contempt. But, that a Man who muſt ever be dear to his nation, for the ſervices he has rendered it;—that a Man, of whom one may perhaps ſay with truth, what was ſaid of Cato, that he was the laſt of the Romans;—that a Man who leaves to his poſterity examples of virtue, great actions to imitate, ſhould load himſelf with ſuch trappings, eſpecially in a Republican State, was a weakneſs ſcarcely pardonable in him; it was blending himſelf with thoſe deſpicable mountebanks I before mentioned. Were I his Son, I would atone for this weakneſs of my Father, which, perhaps, I might have been the chief cauſe of; I would give up the title of *Lord*, and the penſion, and glory in my poverty, to bear the plain, but immortal name—of PITT.

ſelf-ſufficiency, pride, haughtineſs and harſhneſs, which the Miniſtry aſſume in the Parliament-Houſe? Who can help being ſurpriſed to hear them ſtigmatiſe, as factious, thoſe wiſe Members of the Houſe who do not applaud their operations; to hear them accuſed of blowing up the ſpirit of riot in the minds of the nation?

Although Lord North cannot be ſuſpected of being a *conjuror*, one might however, on this occaſion, miſtake him for one, in his anſwer to Mr. Burke, when that reſpectable and enlightened Man complained, laſt April, that ſeveral Members of the Houſe, who were in his party, had paſſed over to that of the Miniſtry. I was ſo ſtruck with that anſwer of Lord North's, that I ſhall not forget it as long as I live, eſpecially on account of the event that followed it. The cauſe of that *tumultuous and tragic farce*, acted during the firſt days of June, 1780, ſeems unknown to this day, except to God alone: but it is probable that men will one day come at the knowledge of it. All that I can at preſent aſſert, is, that it would be an error the moſt dangerous,

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for the Engliſh nation to attribute thoſe riots to the debates of Oppoſition, as it is inceſſantly inſinuated to the people. It is an eaſy matter to perceive *the deſigns and motives* of this conduct.

Muſt not the Members of Parliament who are in the Miniſterial party, *be greatly humbled*, to hear Miniſters domineer in ſo imperious a tone, ſince themſelves may every moment *be expoſed to the like treatment?* Would one not think thoſe Miniſters had covered themſelves with glory? Would one not think their country was indebted to them for matchleſs trophies, for infinite ſucceſs? And yet it is impoſſible for them not to own, that they have never foreſeen any thing; that they have always been taken unawares; that they have always received laws from their enemies; that they have always been at the fag end of their operations; that they never knew how to be before-hand with them, nor to plan any enterpriſe that could be uſeful to their country. It is impoſſible for them not to grant, that they have let ſlip the moſt favourable opportunities, from which they might have drawn the greateſt advantages. All this is certainly fully

fully demonſtrated in what I have ſet forth above; but to enable the reader to judge of it with more facility, I will recapitulate what I have ſaid. Let us begin with the out-ſet of their operations.

Miniſtry announced it to be an eaſy matter to bring the Americans, by compulſion, to the obedience they require; in conſequence of which, they are permitted to act. What happens? They miſcarry. What excuſe do they make? That they are ill informed. This excuſe is overlooked, and they are allowed to act a ſecond time. They miſcarry again. What is their anſwer? That they were ill informed. Even this puerile plea is admitted with patience. They demand immenſe ſubſidies, which are granted, and they are ſuffered to act. What falls out? A few tranſient ſucceſſes, ſhortly followed by the loſs of an entire army, &c. What do Miniſters then ſay? They throw the fault on the Generals; they diſgrace them, though thoſe Generals miſcarried only becauſe the operations they had in charge were impracticable.

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I never ſaw any thing worſe concerted than thoſe operations. It is not poſſible to imagine any thing more unconnected, and more contrary even to the execution of the projects which the Miniſters had planned. *I ſpeak it boldly; had Miniſters concerted with the Americans a plan of operations that could be no ways prejudicial to the latter, whilſt it would bring on the ruin and deſtruction of England,* it would not have been in the power of the Americans to propoſe to them *a plan better adapted to thoſe two purpoſes.* I will be bound to demonſtrate it, *if it becomes neceſſary.* It is ſufficient, in order to avoid all conteſt, that the Miniſtry ſhould *diſcloſe what were their deſigns* when they had recourſe to thoſe operations; and, if their diſcloſure is not accurate, *I am able to ſtate it in its full light.*

It is four years, I repeat it, ſince I announced the reverſe of fortune experienced by the Britiſh armies in America, and the impoſſibility of expecting any ſucceſs from their arms: but if people are unwilling to believe that I announced it four years ago, they will not refuſe to credit my having announced

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it above three years ago, if they will be at the trouble to enquire of his Excellency Sir Joſeph Yorke; for that was one of the firſt topics of my converſation with him, when I had the honour to ſee him, at the beginning of the month of September, 1778. I therefore have on my ſide, at leaſt, without any contradiction, the campaigns of 1778, 1779, 1780, and ſhall have every ſubſequent one, unleſs the Americans give up the conteſt. But, as long as they ſhall maintain it, I warrant it impoſſible to do any thing againſt them, in the poſition in which the Britiſh army for five years paſt has remained, at New-York; while, with the forces ſent to America ſo early as 1776, there were *infallible methods* to terminate ſucceſsfully the affairs of America, *in two campaigns*. Let us proceed.

Miniſtry has ever been taken unawares; and I prove it thus. It was taken unawares in the war againſt the Americans; it was taken unawares at the period of the treaty between France and the Americans; it was taken unawares at the time of the union of France and Spain, after the Miniſters ſo repeatedly

edly made boaſt in the Parliament-Houſe, that they ſhould ill deſerve the places they held, if they had not always on foot forces capable of bringing down the united powers of France and Spain. Did they then, I repeat it, take all the Powers in Europe for a flock of timorous birds, that ſuffered themſelves to be ſcared by a parcel of rags hung out in a field?

Miniſters have always received laws from their enemies; which I prove thus. France concludes a treaty with the Americans; Lord North immediately propoſes a treaty with the Americans. My Lord, you often ſet before your countrymen the example of the Romans, in order to rouſe them to conſtancy and reſolution. Since you are ſo converſant in Hiſtory, tell me, I pray you, whether ever Roman behaved as your Lordſhip did, on the like occurrence? Tell me what would have been the thought of a Roman who ſhould have acted as you did? Was it not evident that that ſtep would be looked upon by the Americans as a ſign of puſillanimity on your part? Was it not evident that that ſtep would en-

courage them to purſue their operations with ſtill greater vigour than before, and that nothing would reſult from it to you, but the diſgrace of having taken a ſtep that would be rejected with the utmoſt contempt? Once more, my Lord; after that ſtep, is there *any ſhame* left in you when you ſay it is the debates of the Oppoſition that encourage our enemies, and diſcourage the nation? What greater diſcouragement to the nation than to ſee you take ſuch a ſtep on that occaſion? Was it not declaring that you no longer knew which way to turn? What greater encouragement to the Americans, than to ſee you nominate a pompous embaſſy, headed by an Engliſh *Elégant* and *Petit-Maître, a pretty inſtrument* for all operations in general, but particularly for this—*was he not*, my Lord? What greater encouragement for the Americans than to ſee your Ambaſſadors commiſſioned to hold out to them propoſals ſo advantageous, that, except the name of Independence, they had all the advantages of Independence, and there remained to England nothing but to ſee itſelf loaded with the additional weight of American debts? The

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more dazzling thoſe propoſals were, the more diſtruſt they muſt inſpire, the more they beſpoke a ſtate of diſtreſs, and conſequently the more they encouraged the Americans to reject them. We proceed. — M. D'Eſtaing goes and takes the command of a fleet which France ſends to the aſſiſtance of the Americans: there were a hundred ways of baffling this project; he might have been ſtopt in the Mediterranean; he might have been ſtopt at the mouth of the Streights of Gibraltar; it was very eaſy to be before-hand with him in America. All theſe meaſures were of the utmoſt neceſſity, eſpecially at the commencement of a war with France, where it was of the higheſt importance to oppoſe the ſucceſs of her firſt operations in favour of the Americans. Yet Miniſters never had this in contemplation; but, like children who run after a bird they have let fly, they ſent Admiral Byron to run after and trace Count D'Eſtaing, though there was a phyſical impoſſibility of his being able to overtake him, &c. &c. If this be not to follow the dictates of an enemy, I know not what is.

Miniſtry let ſlip the moſt favourable opportunities, whence they might have derived

the greateſt advantages, had they known how to improve them. I have proved, in my Memorial, how little they availed themſelves of the ſituation Europe was in at the period of France's alliance with the Americans; and I have made known all the advantages they might have drawn from it. It has been eaſy to perceive, in the courſe of this work, a multitude of occaſions, from which the Miniſtry might have hoped the greateſt ſucceſs, if they had known how to lay hold of them properly.

In November laſt, a Member of Parliament, zealous for the good of his country, aſked why Admiral Keppel, and ſeveral other Officers, whoſe capacity and ſuperiority of genius are proved and acknowledged by many illuſtrious deeds, were not employed? That Member ſet forth, in a convincing manner, all the advantages the Nation had to expect from their ſervices, and the neceſſity there was of them in the preſent critical ſtate of the Nation. A Lord of the Admiralty anſwered, he knew not the reaſons that hindered them from preſenting themſelves, and

aſking

aſking for employment. Admiral Keppel, guided by the light of fatal experience, ſaid, that a man muſt be a *Bedlamite* who would aſk to be employed by ſuch an Adminiſtration.

Unfortunately, ever ſince the world has exiſted, it has but too often happened, that nations have been governed by men whoſe mean jealouſy, wickedneſs, and incapacity, have forced able men from the management of affairs, ſenſible that their knowledge and abilities could be of no utility to their country under ſuch Miniſters, whoſe ſole occupation would be to ſeek means of making them miſcarry, and of diſgracing them. *This is what has cauſed the ruin of almoſt all nations.* But it has never yet, ſo far as I know, happened that Miniſters publickly made it a ſubject of ſorry jeſts and buffoonery. It was reſerved for Lord North to make uſe, in a full Houſe, of that inexhauſtible fund of mirth and *keen pleaſantry*, with which he is endued — pleaſantry, which *ſo well becomes the dignity of his office, and the importance of the ſubjects he treats!* — it was, I ſay, reſerved for

for Lord North to uſe them on an occaſion which ſeemed too ſerious to give room to the ſlighteſt ſarcaſm.

Lord North, after having *wittily, according to his cuſtom,* played upon the word Bedlamite, added, that Miniſters muſt look upon themſelves as *Bedlamites* if they employed ſuch men.

What! my Lord, you act as Prime Miniſter, and are ſo indifferent to the fate of your Country, as to prefer all the misfortunes which you expoſe it to, and which it has hitherto experienced, to the fear of appearing mad in your own eyes, if you were to employ thoſe able and experienced men that are in a capacity of ſerving it eſſentially, and ſaving it from the ruin with which it is threatened! This is, I muſt own, a very uncommon delicacy and indifference.

What! my Lord, you are Prime Miniſter; and you would look upon yourſelf as mad if you employed, if you did your utmoſt to employ, thoſe able and experienced men I

juſt

juſt now mentioned, though, by acting as you do, there has hitherto reſulted, and muſt needs reſult from it, the entire ruin of your native country!

My Lord, you are perhaps *not the firſt that has thought ſo*; but, depend upon it, you are the firſt, ſince the world began, *that dared to make it his boaſt*: depend upon it, you are the firſt, ſince the world began, that could turn a ſubject of that importance *into a ſubject of buffoonery and pitiful jeſting*. How happy are you, my Lord, in being able *to laugh at every thing!*

After that, my Lord, be juſt *but for once*; and no longer accuſe the debates of the Oppoſition, in order to exculpate yourſelf for your ill ſucceſs; for, beſides your operations being bad in themſelves, you deprive yourſelf of the means of bringing them to a happy iſſue; *and, what is worſt of all, you deprive yourſelf of the important counſels of thoſe able men* I have been ſpeaking of, with whom you might plan *better meaſures*; a piece of advice, *as you ſee*, my Lord, *you ſtand in the greateſt*

greateſt need of. After this, my Lord, acknowledge *the lenity and indulgence of your nation towards you.*

It may be preſumed, without fear of a miſtake, that it was to make themſelves merry, that the Lords North, Sandwich, and Stormont, ſome time ago, cauſed notice to be given in a public paper, that they were going to be ſent to the Tower, becauſe a hurricane had happened in the Weſt-Indies, that had occaſioned great devaſtation; for thoſe Gentlemen know how to laugh and jeſt at every thing; *and it muſt be confeſſed, that jeſting is here mighty ſuitable!* Tell me, my Lords, why did you not advertiſe, a few days ago, that you were to be ſent to the Tower, becauſe the French ſurpriſed the Iſle of Jerſey, and that, becauſe you had not a ſingle boat there, to watch the motions of France that way? The advertiſement would, in my opinion, have been better beſtowed; for why did not the enterpriſe ſucceed? Merely becauſe France employed in that expedition but eight hundred, or at moſt a thouſand men. If it had employed only two thouſand five

hundred

hundred men, you will grant that the buſineſs had been done. Well, my Lords, will you ſtill plume yourſelves on the ſaving of Jerſey? You ſee that it fared with Jerſey, this year, as with Plymouth two years ago; you ſee that you are always taken at a nonplus, even in thoſe places where you ought to be moſt upon your guard.

Lord North, in a ſpeech to the Houſe of Commons, on the 25th of laſt January, after having ſaid, "that he begged to be thought "ſincere when he owned that the actual "ſituation of Britain was very alarming," added, "To ſay alarming, is not to ſay "deſperate; and when the national courage, "the diſtinguiſhing character of which is, "to increaſe in proportion to the obſtacles "thrown in its way — when the diſplay of "the reſources and powers of this country, "are complete; then may the nation flatter "itſelf with ſeeing again thoſe days of glory "and proſperity which have ſeveral times "ſhone upon it." Would not a man think that Lord North was willing to raiſe a ſuſpicion, that the nation has hitherto acted

with remiſſneſs; that the nation has parcimoniouſly uſed the reſources it is poſſeſſed of, which has been the cauſe of all the misfortunes it has experienced, which has made all the operations of Lord North and the other Miniſters miſcarry? Lord North, however, knows full well the contrary.

You, my Lord, who with ſo much ſubtilty lately propoſed an amendment to Mr. Fox's motion concerning Admiral Keppel, becauſe you were pleaſed to think it *ill worded*, don't you perceive that all I have been rehearſing of your ſpeech to the Houſe of Commons is exceſſively *ill worded?* and that, to expreſs yourſelf properly, you ſhould have ſaid —

.... When the national courage, the diſtinguiſhing character of which is, to increaſe in proportion to the obſtacles thrown in its way—when the diſplay of the powers and reſources of this country are complete; when there are at the helm of government, *Miniſters capable of making a right uſe of them*, Miniſters capable of planning uſeful operations, &c. ... then may the nation hope to ſee again thoſe days

days of glory and proſperity that have ſeveral times ſhone upon it: but, as long as there are at the head of Adminiſtration, *Miniſters* whoſe inſufficiency and emptineſs are well known *by long and fatal experience*; as long as there are at the head of Adminiſtration, *Miniſters* who deviſe and plan none but falſe operations; as long as there are at the head of affairs, *Miniſters who have the daringneſs* to ſay in a full Houſe, *that they ſhould be Bedlamites* if they employed men whoſe capacity and ſuperiority of genius are proved and acknowledged by many illuſtrious deeds, although a contrary conduct has hitherto tended to, and will in time complete, the overthrow of their Country; as long as there are at the head of Adminiſtration, *Miniſters* who . . . . . (your Lordſhip underſtands me without need of my ſaying more) ſo long muſt the nation, guided in its judgement by the paſt, perceive that new efforts of its courage, complete exertions of its powers and reſources, will be abſolutely ineffectual; and nothing will be the reſult, but its ſure and approaching ruin.

Expreſs yourſelf thus, my Lord, *and make this motion:* I can then aſſure you, after all that I have been ſetting forth, it will paſs with unanimous and uncontrouled aſſent — I will anſwer for it, that not a man of your nation will think it *ill worded.* — You ſee, my Lord, that the purport of that ſpeech ſhould have been, to open the eyes of the nation *concerning the true cauſe of its misfortunes;* and not to buoy it up *with deceitful hopes,* as long as it ſuffers the cauſe of its misfortunes to ſubſiſt. I ſhall ſoon have occaſion, my Lord, to mention this ſpeech, which deſerves more comments than one, as does that of Lord Stormont on the ſame day.

The Miniſtry promiſed wonders at the beginning of the war againſt the Americans, *and have miſcarried in every thing hitherto.* The Miniſtry promiſed wonders at the time France declared againſt England, at the period of the union between France and Spain againſt England, *and have miſcarried in every thing hitherto.* The Miniſtry now promiſe wonders. I believe this to be a conjuncture in which the *future* may be judged by the

paſt,

paſt, without fear of being miſtaken. *Full of wiles and craft*; * *given up to the meaneſt and moſt pitiful intrigues*, they are bold, even to temerity, when they ought to be circumſpect; they are prudent, even to puſillanimity, when they ought to be enterpriſing. Their operations, their orders, bear the impreſſion of that fluctuation, of that irreſolution of their minds. It is apparent they only grope about in the dark, in the moſt gloomy darkneſs.

This is, I believe, ſufficient to convince Miniſters, that for above theſe four years paſt

* For example; theſe three or four months paſt, Miniſters make a mighty pother concerning a multitude of Spies which they ſay they cauſe to be taken up every day. But, my Lords, to what purpoſe all this ſtir? Is it not plain, that *this little State-trick* is meant only to lull the nation aſleep, and make it believe it is the Spies that occaſion all your ill ſucceſs? What the plague can a few wretched Spies do, to prejudice your operations? Is not the man who has ſeen you act once, ſure to ſee you repeat for ten years ſucceſſively the ſame operations, let them be ever ſo bad? When a Spy is found out, and that is a matter of no great merit, he is hanged immediately without ſo much ado; and there is no more ſaid about him.—To take up one's thoughts any longer with ſuch paltry rogues, is doing them too much honour.

paſt I have ſtudied them thoroughly, that I have thoroughly ſtudied their operations: but, if this ſample is not ſufficient to convince them of it, I have many more things of high concern; *they may make me ſpeak, if they think proper.*

Out of forbearance to Lord Stormont, I did not commemorate, in my Memorial, that, together with the offer of a paſſport, his Lordſhip ſent me the following meſſage: "That he had written to his Excellency Sir Joſeph Yorke, to charge him not to let me come over to England." I owe to Sir Joſeph Yorke this reſpectful teſtimony of my ſincere gratitude; he honoured me too much with his eſteem, to impart to me ſuch an order. But, if I had had to do with a Miniſter leſs worthy of my reſpect; if I had had to do with a Miniſter who, in purſuance of thoſe orders, would have put an obſtacle to my arrival in London, I would rather have ſwam acroſs the ſea, than not have come and reproached Lord Stormont *to his face* with his injuſtice—rather than not have come and made it known to the whole Engliſh nation!

What!

What! Lord Stormont receives my labour; he loads it with encomiums; he makes uſe of it; (when I ſay he makes uſe of it, I ought to ſay, *he makes uſe of it bunglingly; for, had he known how to make a right uſe of it, the Northern Confederacy would not have taken place)* — in ſhort, he makes uſe of it, however, after a faſhion. *Let him ſay, whether I deviate from the truth?* If he makes a bungling uſe of it, that is certainly not my fault; and, in order to appropriate the whole of it to himſelf, he would wiſh to hinder me from appearing, he would wiſh to deprive me of the reward of my labour.

My Lord! I think there is nothing more noble, than for a man to live on the fruit of his labours, eſpecially when he has no recourſe to protection to recommend them. In that reſpect, my Lord, You and I are not, you know, upon equal terms. *

Now

* Your Lordſhip knows the obligations you are under to your Uncle, Lord Mansfield, for the place you occupy. *An excellent proof of his judgement and ſkill!* Yet it is that ſame

Now tell me at what rate does the Government pay your labours, of which we have juſt now ſeen the value, and of which the real value will be ſtill better known *ere long*? Tell me at what rate Government pays you for your labours? You, who are unacquainted *with the very firſt rudiments of your profeſſion—I ſpeak knowingly of the matter, my Lord*; I hope you will not refuſe me that juſtice — You, who think you pay me ſo well for mine, in hardly reimburſing me the charges I was at to come and preſent them to you; You, who to reward me ſeek to vilify me; You, who . . . Fie upon't! . . . Lord Stormont is the only man in the world that can be capable of ſo baſe, ſo deſpicable behaviour.

When

ſame Lord, who, after *this token of his diſcernment*, would fain have us to look upon the loſs of his Manuſcripts as irreparable. It is true, he is that ſame Lord who, when his proceedings are arraigned, has recourſe to his grey hairs, to endeavour to excite public pity and compaſſion. Yes; he does excite compaſſion! How little did I know that *equitable Lord*, when I wrote to him laſt September! I am no longer ſurpriſed he did not give me an anſwer: he muſt have looked upon the ill-deſerved encomiums I paſſed upon his virtues, as a piece of mockery.

When I wrote to Lord Stormont, that, if my labour deſerved nothing but diſdain, by publiſhing it I was toiling for his glory; *that I was adding freſh laurels to thoſe with which he is already crowned*; that all Europe, and England in particular, would admire *his equity, his knowledge*, &c. Lord Stormont cauſed me to be told, that I muſt no longer rely on his protection. *I aſk pardon* of Mr. Fraſer, his Lordſhip's Secretary, for interrupting him at theſe firſt words; but I could not help anſwering him immediately, that I had never craved of Lord Stormont any protection; that I did not come over for that purpoſe, and that my own work was the ſole protector I had deſigned to employ. I told him, I was ſurpriſed to hear a Miniſter talk of protection; *him who owes every thing to his King and Country*; him who ought to conſult nothing, eſpecially in conjunctures ſo arduous as the preſent, but the abilities of thoſe whom he employs, &c.

A Miniſter who talks of protection, declares he looks upon the places at his diſpoſal as *ſinecures*, which he is ready to beſtow on

thoſe that prove moſt agreeable to him; from which cauſe, on one ſide, reſults the degeneracy of the people, who, inſtead of rendering themſelves capable, no longer think of any thing but becoming fawning ſycophants; and, on the other ſide, the ruin of the State, through the emptineſs and inſufficiency of thoſe who occupy the offices of Government.

I know that ſome perſons in office have lately ſaid, that I had wit, and that there was no doubt of my being a Spy * to the Count de Vergennes,

* I am glad to inform the Public, that, ſince this work appeared in French, people are more and more induſtrious to ſpread the report *of my being a Spy*. Such is the infamous cloak endeavoured to be thrown over the injuſtice practiſed towards me. Such are the baſe and ſhameful means uſed to endeavour to make me loſe every degree of conſideration. I never could have thought there were in England men capable of ſuch dark malignity. I am ſenſible their behaviour juſtifies me. Such efforts would not be made to vilify me, if I were a baſe fellow void of abilities. However, let thoſe who ſpread, or cauſe to be ſpread, this report, as infamous as it is ſenſeleſs, be ever *ſo well practiſed in the art of deceiving the Public*, I own I ſhall think them much *more verſed in that art*, than I hitherto thought them, if they can contrive to perſuade the nation that *a Spy can have been the Author of this Expoſure of the Miniſterial Operations*.

de Vergennes, who knows me very well. I did not think I could ever paſs for a man of wit; *nay, more, I ſhould be very ſorry to be a man of wit.* For above thirty years paſt, I have had occaſions to convince me, that wit only ſhines at the expence of judgement and ſenſe. I have not ſeen one ſingle man of wit, who did not confirm me in that notion; and I have, however, ſeen many witty people. It is impoſſible to imagine any thing leſs ſolid, or more unconnected, *than the ideas of men of wit:* it is impoſſible to imagine any thing more ſupercilious, more empty, more diſguſtful, *than the behaviour of a man of wit.* To return to my own concern; thoſe who paſſed on me the judgement I have mentioned, might poſſibly diſplay their own wit, but they certainly ſhew very little *diſcernment.* To be convinced of it, a perſon need only read, with ſome degree of attention, the Memorial I have publiſhed. I defy all mankind, after that, to entertain the ſhadow of that ſuſpicion. However, it is no hard matter to perceive the motives that gave riſe to ſuch reflections; and it is no very ſubtile contrivance for ſuch *mighty Politicians.*

What

What I have ſaid in my Memorial, concerning the Count de Vergennes, I only ſaid after I had ſet forth his operations; and I defy any ſenſible man, however partial he may be, to deny him the moſt exalted encomiums. What I here ſay concerning the Britiſh Miniſters, I do not ſay but after having expoſed their operations; and I defy every ſenſible man, however well affected towards them, *to grant them the leaſt degree of approbation.* In what I have ſaid of the Count de Vergennes, I intended to bring the Engliſh nation acquainted with the men againſt whom it had to act, to the end it might be able to judge whether thoſe who held the reins of Government, are capable of wreſtling with ſuch men. *That knowledge, methinks, is of no ſmall importance.*

A Member of Parliament has ſaid, that the Memorial I publiſhed is deſtitute of common ſenſe. I wiſh *that great Man* joy of his abilities; and, to enhance *the luſtre of his glory*, I here confeſs to him, that the different objects of labour to be found in that Memorial are the fruits of more than five and twenty years

years almoſt continual toil, reflexion, and experience. That Man, who has not, by a great deal, reflected ſo much as I have, muſt be endued with an uncommon ſpirit of penetration, ſince he condemns in one moment, as deſtitute of common ſenſe, what with me is the produce of above five and twenty years reflection. If that be the caſe, I invite him to impart to the Public, and to the Government, his capacity; the juncture is very favourable for ſo doing. It would be a great pity to leave in darkneſs and obſcurity knowledge ſo extenſive as his; and he has not yet either *ſaid or produced any thing* that can render him *ſuſpected of poſſeſſing any abilities.*

With concern I have heard, that ſome valuable men diſapprove of what I ſay concerning myſelf, at the beginning of my Memorial. Had I ſpoken of myſelf oſtentatiouſly, had I endeavoured to raiſe a prepoſſeſſion in my behalf, I am ſenſible it would have been enough to tire and diſguſt the reader: but I challenge any one to find, in what I have ſaid, a ſingle word that tends to my own

own commendation. I thought it my duty to inform the Public candidly of what had forced me to quit my native country, and come to offer my ſervice to His Majeſty the King of Great-Britain. It ſeems to me that this, eſpecially as I was circumſtanced, was indiſpenſable; and it is what I have done with all poſſible plainneſs and ſincerity.

I have not cauſed the Memorial, often mentioned in this Expoſure, to be tranſlated into Engliſh, becauſe, as it chiefly contains political matters, thoſe matters, though very intereſting to Great-Britain, would probably not be within the reach of every perſon's capacity, and few perhaps would chuſe to employ their thoughts about them. Yet, if the Public deſires to have a knowledge of that Memorial, it will be ſufficient to intimate the deſire through the channel of the news-papers; and I will then haſten to have it tranſlated into Engliſh. It will be ſeen, that thoſe operations were utterly unknown to Lord Stormont, and the reſt of the Miniſtry, before I had imparted my labours to them. If the

Miniſters

Miniſters diſpute with me this truth, I pledge myſelf to the Public, that I will ſtate it in its full evidence — And yet how will Lord Stormont carry on this buſineſs? *The beſt work, in his hands, muſt needs be marred.*

THE END.

[111]

Ministers dispute with me this truth, I pledge myself to the Public, that I will state it in its full evidence — And yet how will Lord Stormont carry on this business? *The best work, in his hands, must needs be marked.*

THE END.